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WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1847

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ENERGY ECONOMICS FRANCE

NUCLEAR DEBATE, PETROLEUM DEPENDENCY, ENERGY OPTIONS

Paris LE MATIN in French 28 Sep 81 p 14

[Article by Andre Giraud, former minister of industry]

[Text] The new parliament will soon begin its debate of the energy policy in general, and nuclear policy in particular. The commission responsible for informing the deputies and senators about this issue did not deem it worthwhile to question Andre Giraud, the former minister of industry, who was one of the main architects of France's nuclear policy during the 7-year term of Giscard d'Estaing. Andre Giraud does consider it wise to testify on such a vital issue, however, and he has chosen LE MATIN as his forum for making this statement public.

The policy expressed by the new president during his campaign is based on two propositions: "a policy for the independence of France, saying 'yes' to nuclear energy, but not to the all-nuclear approach." I can easily support these two propositions. The first one, for obvious reasons. And the second, because the "all nuclear" approach has never been anything but a grossly distorted slogan, shouted by opponents of nuclear energy to distort and criticize the policy implemented. So let's get rid of this myth, and the debate will only gain in clarity.

But behind these two general propositions, there may be a better or a worse course to follow. The actions taken so far would suggest that the worse course has been chosen. The freeze of the nuclear program is costing money and is encouraging opposition, although this freeze is perfectly useless, even if the program is changed. The only decision made to date--to stop Plogoff, one of the best nuclear sites in France--shows that more weight is being given to the rocks hurled by demonstrators than to the votes cast by Brittany's elected officials.

The Socialist Party, with a strong majority in the assembly, holds in its grasp the outcome of a debate which I will pay it the compliment of still believing that it would like to guide in accordance with the nation's best interests. So I will say to this party: this debate cannot consist of confronting the positions of the right and of the left, as if oil and gas were on the left and electricity were on the right. This debate is a matter of national defense and of the economy. As General de Gaulle used to say: "It is France which is at stake here." The election is over now. You no longer have the excuse of not having access to all the information. You are now accountable to the nation.

This is the heart of the problem. All of our road transport, the major part of our industrial activity, and a large proportion of our comfort are dependent on oil. And at the same time, 90 percent of the French petroleum supply comes from the Middle East and from North Africa. OPEC holds 85 to 90 percent of the international oil trade. So it is hardly possible to change this situation in any substantial way. And it is a situation which our diplomacy cannot afford to disregard. A petroleum policy is still needed. But we must, using every means possible, seek to liberate France from oil threats.

The way we do this must preserve for our nation its best possible opportunities for progress and development. That is what the French people want, and in general, a certain increase in our energy consumption is to be expected, even if there is some dispute about the magnitude of this increase. On this subject, the technocratic controversy about the ratio between economic growth and the rise in energy consumption is not worth a great deal, in relation to common sense: the French people do not want to be short of energy. They would not forgive their leaders for having organized energy shortages and higher prices, the trademark of underdeveloped peoples, because of a doctrinaire mentality. We should not forget the widespread protests of the nation about the great electricity shutdown on 19 December 1978. A responsible government cannot allow itself to fall too far short in its forecasts, using the pretext that the outer limit of the experts' optimism is not necessarily impossible to achieve.

We must, therefore, program on bases that are realistically possible to achieve, for it would take 10 years to correct such a mistake after it is found.

Our first recourse against an energy threat obviously lies in trying to get along without energy. This is called energy conservation, and everyone is in favor of it. After eliminating the most glaring

wastes, we are now in the phase of adapting existing facilities and of creating new forms of energy usage. This is where any progress will come from now on, and such progress will be slow. To hasten it, the government can act in one of two ways: by regulation or by financial incentives. I don't think much more can be gained by regulation. There are already voluminous regulations, some sections of which would delight the heart of a satirist. It is simply not possible to multiply hassles and controlers, and to create a truly restrictive rationing system, on the pretext of avoiding the rationing that would have to be implemented in case of an oil crisis.

As for subsidies, since I am not in the administration any more, I could call for still more subsidies, leaving it up to Mr Fabius to deal with the problem. But I won't do that. There is a level of subsidy beyond which it becomes more expensive to save energy than to obtain it, and our economy can not allow itself to indulge in any more waste.

The Share of Coal in the Energy Panorama

Our present coal consumption (50 million tons) exceeds all the national production figures issued by both sides: 10, 15, 20, or 30 million tons. So it isn't our national production which limits our use of coal, but the existence of a market for this coal. Coal isn't used for household heating any more, and we are not going to return to the days of the coal bucket. We will gradually have to reconvert our factories, which will take both time and money, and try to develop collective coal heating systems, which is as time-consuming and expensive, but which should be encouraged by the law on district heating systems passed by parliament in 1980.

Inside the coal market thus available, a second debate may arise: what portion of this coal should come from French territory? ducing coal in France is unfortunately a dangerous and difficult job and in most of our mines, it is ruinous. Certainly, we must maintain the jobs of the miners presently employed, and coordinate coal cutbacks with the industrial reorganization in some regions. But when these two conditions have been met, let's not be naive. There is no justification for paying much higher prices for energy in advance, in order to protect ourselves from possible price increases later. The world coal industry is just beginning an expansion which will be a large one. This summer I visited two mines in the United States; together, these two mines produce more coal than the French Coal Company does, and with 712 people. Let us seek rather, with our men and our methods, to take our place in this industry, as we have managed -- a little too late, unfortunately--to take our place in the petroleum industry. Won't we be proud to make the French Coal Company a new ELF [petroleum] group?

Underground coal gasification is another problem. This process offers both great interest in terms of developing coal reserves that can not be mined, and great technical difficulties. The program that has been begun is of high quality. It should be given the increased funding needed to carry it out, but its eventual success will not bring about any production during this decade.

Although the cost of gas will from now on be at least as high as petroleum, it is still reasonable to use it in order to improve the diversification of our supply sources. But we cannot afford to lose sight of this objective. I will solemnly draw parliament's attention to the fact that we have reached the limit of tolerable dependence. We know, since this happened in 1980, that this supply can be interrupted. Gas storage is not easy. We will have nothing to fall back on if the quantity we lack exceeds the percentage of consumption corresponding to facilities which can use another form of energy. The government knows this figure, which I think it is better not to make public. And I think we can hardly improve our diversification before several more years have elapsed. All these factors limit our use of gas.

An Opportunity for the Administration

Renewable energy sources deserve our close attention. We know that hydroelectric power can hardly be developed any further, and in any event, it would not be desirable to sabotage the beauty of our wild rivers in order to squeeze a few more megawatts from them. Geothermal energy has gotten off to a good start and will make a valued contribution to our energy supply, and solar power may gradually come to make another contribution, through the use of solar water heaters, air conditioning, and intelligent architectural design.

But these contributions will only come about very gradually, for it takes 50 years to renew the housing stock.

My personal conviction is that the best way to use solar energy is by exploiting growing plants--this is commonly called biomass.

In fact, no economic solution has yet posed any serious challenge to the dominion of "king oil" in the heart of its power: operating automobiles. Progress in biology, chemistry, and agronomy indicates that a solution is near, and if we work hard and with the same political determination that has prevailed until now for the nuclear program, I am convinced that 25 to 50 percent of our fuel consumption could, between now and 1990, come from a source other than petroleum. For the new administration, this is a marvelous opportunity to make its personal contribution to the energy liberation of our nation.

The administration will have to be very careful to select only good projects. Some proposals that we hear of, which are technically poorly designed, could be drains on the budget and could discredit this promising approach. I will mention in passing, in order to respond to a fear that is sometimes expressed, that, in this modern version of natural fuels, the percentage of agricultural land used would be limited, and might bring about some reconversions that would be of value to our agriculture.

Nuclear Power: What is Its Risk?

Then there is nuclear energy, which is neither an angel nor a devil. It is certainly, and by far, the most economical of all the energy sources we can use, and it is practically entirely of national origin. We do import uranium, and some people think these uranium imports could become a new source of dependence. This is a mistake. Our own reserves would be sufficient for all the power plants in the program, but we wanted, by importing while we could, to make our own reserves last longer, while at the same time contributing to the development of Africa. Moreover, our stock amounts to enough for a 5-year period of consumption, compared with a 3-month supply for petroleum products.

Starting now, nuclear energy is going to enable us to replace more expensive methods of producing electricity, and the cost of electricity in relation to other energy sources has already begun to decline. This is an important boost for our economy, and will help to reduce the electricity bill, especially for people of modest incomes. It is also beginning to spur on the industrialization of France, just as hydroelectric power in its day helped to develop the aluminum and ferrous alloy industries, and France's coal industry helped to develop the steel and mechanical industries.

So, where is the problem? Why would it be good to build a 60,000-MW nuclear capacity, and terrible to build a 67,000-MW capacity?

One surprising argument which is put forth is that we would have too much electricity. This is indeed surprising, since--without even mentioning that the very same people were accusing the government of lack of foresight at the time of the great electricity shutdown in 1978--it is this electricity production capacity which is by far the most powerful weapon we have, along with energy conservation, for attacking the use of petroleum for household and industrial heating (and the two methods combined will not be too much). We have turned this weapon over to our successors: it is now up to them to make good use of it.

So long as nuclear power plants were not in operation, any increased electricity consumption meant increased oil consumption. This is no longer true today. Nuclear power will now enable us to do without oil in producing electricity in a France which consumes less electricity per capita than most of the other major countries. With the price differential increasing, this will stimulate the consumption of electricity. This is a trend we had slowed down, and one which the new administration should now encourage.

Concern about nuclear power is a problem, and there are only two reasonable attitudes to use in dealing with this concern: understanding and firmness. Firmness in response to those minorities which would like to impose their will and their form of society by means of violence; and understanding for all those who, very legitimately, want, as they have a right, to know what the truth is.

The difficulty is great, because the problem is a highly technical one, because nuclear energy has had two terrifying uses, and because the debate has begun on a poor footing: is it possible to reduce the risks to zero? The answer to this question cannot be a positive one, any more than it can for any other human activity. Then, what are the risks? It is now generally agreed that in normal operation, nuclear energy is particularly clean and safe. No fatal accident has yet occurred. But everyone says: yes, but what if the "big accident" happened? This is a problem I often pondered over when I was responsible for nuclear energy.

There is no perfect solution. If Plogoff were to be replaced by coal-burning plants of an equivalent power, during the 25 years of their life, these plants would consume 300 million tons of coal (300 million!). Based on statistics, we can calculate how many deaths (from accidents, silicosis, or mine cave-ins) would be caused by mining this amount of coal. The figure is of the same order of magnitude as the one for the most serious nuclear accident that can be imagined, but in the case of nuclear energy, the probability of such an accident is minimal.

There is another debate about the issue of fuel reprocessing. The nation should realize that many studies have been done, primarily in the United States, since President Carter attempted to ban it, in order to determine if it were possible to do without fuel reprocessing. It is now clear that reprocessing is the only valid way to handle these irradiated fuels cleanly, by extracting the nuclear wastes—whose quantity is extremely small—and by placing them in the best possible form of storage. In so doing, we can recover almost the equivalent of our present national uranium production.

Once the Super-Phenix breeder reactor is operating, there will be time enough to decide what follow-up to give the breeder program. We should, however, be aware that if we use the French uranium reserves in breeders, they would represent more energy than all the oil in Saudi Arabia.

Spectacle vs. Serious Issues

Now I want to say a word about the problem of administrative procedures and information. It was the complication of procedures, and nothing else, which halted the American and German programs, without either country actually wanting or deciding to do so. Our administrative procedures have already reached a minimum and irreducible level of 547 days. We must be careful not to favor the spectacular over the serious issue, and the multiplication of appeals—a favorite weapon of the minority who oppose nuclear energy—to the clearcut nature of the democratic decision—making process.

As for keeping the public informed, we must do everything in our power to improve this. Professionals in the field know that there are two ways of keeping information concealed: either to say nothing, or to drown the public with too much information. The antinuclear people prefer the second method, because it is easy to make incomprehensible information seem frightening!

Let me make one point clear: any government that would do such a thing as agree to make the report on the La Hague plant public would deserve blame, for everyone realizes that the technology for producing plutonium must not be made public. And any government, in order to win popularity, that would agree to make all safety service reports public would be culpable. Just as a prosecutor wants to be able to check out his suspicions without seeing them published in a newspaper, so safety inspectors must be able to work in a calm atmosphere. If not, they will not write down their suspicions until these suspicions have been confirmed. And safety will be lost as a result.

After making these two comments, let me say that yesterday when I was in the government and today when I am a private citizen, I have always found that every time information has been made available in a comprehensible and objective way, it has decreased public worries about nuclear energy.

And finally, the debate seems to be inclined to arouse the old specter of a parliamentary technology evaluation office, despite the manifest failure of the U.S. attempt at such a system. Parliament can question anyone it wants about these issues. Why should it set up a few experts as a new technocracy?

7679

CSO: 3100/20

ECONOMIC NETHERLANDS

PROSPECTS FOR NEW TRADE UNION FEDERATION

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 3 Oct 81 p 43

[Article by Dieudonnee ten Berge: How Wise Is the FNV?]

[Text] This week the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions and the Netherlands Catholic Workers Federation will officially merge and become the Federation of the Netherlands Trade Union Movement. Something which has been in existence for years will be legally confirmed. At that moment the Catholic workers movement formally ceases to exist. The socialist organization will only have changed its name.

The merger of NVV and NKV is in the first place based on practical financial reasons. The industrial unions and centers were financially struggling for their existence. In enterprises and businesses they were fighting rationalization but for themselves they found it a good method to keep their heads above water. With one million members it would simultaneously develop enormous power. That has been a bit disappointing although it is verbally succeeding in making one believe otherwise.

The FNV's political contacts are very one-sided. Since the labor movement is not only fighting for the basic interests of its members but is also increasingly involved in activities to change the structure of the society, this is strategically not very wise.

Contacts with the Labor Party are friendly and good but with the biggest political party, the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], the largest trade union federation has no contacts to speak of. Of the 48 members of the CDA fraction in the Second Chamber only Steef Weijers is still a member of an FNV union. This is exactly where the last NKV leaders made a historic blunder.

Soon after the infamous Night of Schmelzer of October 1966 many Catholic union members severed relations with the KVP [Catholic People's Party]. The KVP was classified as rightist and therefore anti-employee. There were quite a few labor leaders in the group of Christian radicals. Originally the PPR [Political Party of Radicals] also got its leaders from the NKV. Later, when the radicals changed their course towards the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] and PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] the NKV supporters did not follow them and loudly proclaimed that Catholic workers should just vote for Uncle Joop [Joop Den Uy1]. Chairman Wim Spit and wage expert Herman Bode became disenchanted with Christian policies.

In the beginning Jan Mertens, Spit's predecessor, came also under extreme pressure to break with the KVP. Mertens, on the other hand saw great dangers for the labor movement in this radical attitude of his erstwhile comrades in arms. Mertens resolutely repudiated a radicalization process of the Dutch labor movement. An appointment to state secretary was his award.

But it was Wim Vergeer, KVP chairman prior to Mertens, who sent the NKV straight into socialist arms. He became chairman because nobody of stature wanted that job after Van der Stee resigned. Vergeer was eager. Vergeer's term of leadership was definitely not one of the KVP's most brilliant. Vergeer could not rely on broad vision but did so on a remarkably simple formulation of not entirely matured ideas of political and social relations. Vergeer was against the socialists. Why was of later concern. Without adequate study he called the NKV program of principles marxist nonsense. The bishops were of a different opinion and proclaimed it a well formulated piece of work with a good presentation of the Catholic vision of man as worker. The KVP also did little to correct somehow the interrupted relations behind the chairman's back. One of the few who did so was Piet van Zeil, presently state secretary of Economic Affairs and Vergeer's successor. However, when Van Zeil received the chairman's gavel, Spit a his followers were no longer in a mood to cooperate. The KVP was, for that matter, so busy with the birth of the CDA that Catholic workers were left to their fate. Higher and medium level personnel, united in the Union BLHP, not wanting to follow the road to the socialist stronghold, left the NKV and moved on independently. The Union has now become part of the master organization under Henk van der Schalie, but it is really no longer playing a role of importance on the ground stage of social relations. In the meantime the NKV lost its contemplative and quieter members.

The Catholic police union and teachers union joined the CNV [National Federation of Christian Workers]. However, then chairman Jan Lanser did not have the vision and flexibility to attract more NKV unions. If he had seen fit to persuade his NKV colleagues to join an equivalent union federation standing shoulder to shoulder with the CDA there would definitely have been a chance.

Whatever was left of beautiful, perhaps sentimental feelings between the NKV leadership and Christian democratic politics disappeared under the first Van Agt government. The FNV followed over the years, albeit always half a year behind, the social economic vision of the cabinet. The persons in charge of Social Affairs, Wil Albeda and Lou de Graaf, both coming from the CNV, took care of that. Of course, for the sake of the members, Kok and Spit had to create a common enemy and scape-goat: Dries van Agt, for 4 years the most maligned Dutchman. Once when he lashed back and denounced undemocratic behavior in certain actions, the FNV stoned him in public. CDA and FNV drifted farther apart from each other. Even informal contacts hardly existed. The CDA did not dare stand up to the FNV loudmouths, the FNV top had no respect for the Christian democratic attitude of placating both sides.

In the meantime the new giant FNV and its strongly grown brother CNV must now try to play such a role in social economics that the workers can identify with their representatives. Exactly in times of economic decline and social uncertainty a strongly organized labor organization is more than needed. A lot of wisdom is therefore required from FNV and CNV. Wisdom to stear clear of polarization, to

work together with politicians and employers towards recovery of the economy. There are still chances enough but discord could ruin them. It is therefore to be hoped that there will be enough solidarity, also within the FNV, to present one common front. The solution cannot be found in overly aggressive statements to satisfy one's own following. Such statements release emotions which are later hard to control. With the PvdA [Labor Party] in the government the FNV has every chance to exert its influences on the government's policies in the coming years. To antagonize those policies would be a sign of weakness.

10319

CSO: 3105/13

ECONOMIC

CALLS FOR CREATION OF MUSLIM COMMON MARKET DISCUSSED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 11 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] It is becoming apparent that in addition to business circles, the government is providing support to a proposal for the creation of a "Common Market" between Islamic countries. Constructors and exporters who have had past success in expanding toward Middle Eastern countries are among the leading proponents of the idea.

Certainly, Turkey would have interests in placing its effort toward greater economic ties with Islamic Middle Eastern countries within the framework of a formal organization. Other nations who are attempting to enter the Middle Eastern and North African markets are also moving in the direction of establishing a political foundation. In comparison to other countries, Turkey certainly enjoys cultural as well as religious advantages. Within the overall framework of multi-faceted economic relations however, such cultural and religious advantages constitute only one aspect among many.

The notion of a "Common Market" brings to mind the example of the European Economic Community. One must not forget however that the geographic, economic, historic, political and cultural foundations that constitute the EEC are very different from the foundations upon which a prospective "Islamic Common Market" would be based. The idea of a "united Europe" is the product of the "Age of Enlightenment" and dates back to the 18th century. It took two centuries for the idea to become reality. Even then, the final result was not in the form of a single United Europe but rather in the form of two unions known as the EEC and CEMA.

The EEC is based on the Rome Agreement of 1958 which calls for the eventual creation of a European State. What has been achieved so far is a customs union between the member states. This customs union was achieved in response to a need for greater markets. It was implemented by joining in conformity with the dictates of market economies the domestic markets of countries that had attained comparative levels of economic development.

Is it possible to claim when speaking of an Islamic Common Market that the potential member states of such an organization are advanced enough and structurally similar enough to form a customs union comparable to the EEC? What is more urgent for the Arab world, which constitutes the core among Islamic nations,

is the formation of an Arab Union on the political front as well as the formation of OAPEC [Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries] and the economic integration of Gulf States on the economic front.

While the notion of an Islamic Common Market should not be discarded, it would prove useful to recognize that this could only be an objective that could be achieved in the long term, following a progression through certain intermediate steps. The development of existing bilateral ties between Turkey and Islamic countries, the revitalization of joint organizations such as the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Data Bank based in Ankara as well as the establishment of similar organizational structures would be tantamount to taking the intermediate steps in question.

9491

CSO: 4654/174

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ECONOMIC

'ARAYIS' HITS 'EUROMONEY' AWARD TO TURGUT OZAL
Ankara ARAYIS in Turkish 5 Sep 81 pp 5-6

[Text]



The EUROMONEY magazine has just distributed this year's Oscars in economics. According to news items that have appeared in just about every Turkish newspaper, Turgut Ozal has been selected economist of the year. It also appears that Turkey has been placed at the head of a list of countries "that have attracted attention by becoming the scene of positive developments."

Regardless of the field of achievement, every award ceremony leaves in its wake the sad as well as the happy. While award winners and their supporters rejoice, those deemed unworthy try to act as if they have fully accepted the verdict. Sometimes however, they display their jealousy behind closed doors.

To one side of this human tragedy stands yet another group composed of masses of silent individuals who stay away from awards, who are content to watch from a distance and who have never been deemed worthy of an award. They read the books that receive awards, watch movies that receive Oscars and look at the front pages of newspapers and magazines to see each year's outstanding achievers.

Granted, the award presented to Turgut Ozal is not like those given to movies or novels. This time, the award concerns more than just those who go to movies or keep abreast of the world of literature. "Economist of the year" is an award that encompasses an entire economy. Consequently, it is of interest to all who make up the silent masses.

We have nothing to say about the award received by Turgut Ozal. After all, the decision belongs to EUROMONEY magazine and the Turkish people were not part of the jury. Nevertheless our country did receive some mention in the Western press at a time when the latter had covered Turkey with a blanket of silence.

Whether the Turkish people will find it easy to accept the award that EUROMONEY has given Ozal is a different question. At this time the masses are likely to declare themselves as candidates for the award. The masses believe that it is they as consumers who are worthy of awards for having survived Turgut Ozal's award-winning implementation of the economic measures of 24 January. They do not think that Ozal himself should win any awards.

The fact that EUROMONEY magazine has selected Turgut Ozal to be the economist of the year is a good illustration of Western economic mentality. This mentality perceives the economy solely in function of production or sales and has seen its operation when various international organizations imposed upon Turkey the economic measures of 24 January. It cannot be said that this mentality will achieve any increases in production.

In reality, economic viability is a function of four processes: production, conversion, distribution and consumption. An economy that cannot ensure a fair distribution of resources or that cannot protect the consumer, will find itself unable to resolve societal problems. Regardless of the high levels of production that such an economy might offer, substantial and long festering wounds would be opened within the societal fabric.

Individuals such as Turgut Ozal observe the economy exclusively from a perspective of production and in due course ignore distribution as well as consumption.

The processes of distribution and consumption are indicative of the social content of an economy. It is only within these processes that the economy stops being a tool and becomes the embodiment of an objective.

Consumers are the silent heroes of these two processes. We do not know whether it is necessary to define a consumer. Consumers make up the largest economic group on earth. Every individual is a consumer from the moment of birth. Regardless of age, sex, race, belief, occupation or place of residence every individual is a consumer.

Naturally, not every income group can equally participate in the process of consumption. It is natural that an individual earning 100,000 liras or more per month will not have the same attitude toward consumption as an individual striving to raise a family on 5,000 to 10,000 liras per month. The truth of the matter is that a very large proportion of people living in Turkey must wage a great struggle to provide for their daily existence. These people are now trying to move ahead on an obstacle-littered path defined by the economic mentality of 24 January. In today's conditions these people are the first to come to mind when we think about consumers.

Protecting the consumer is one of the most important responsibilities of a socially oriented state. The issue of price is the first to come to mind when one thinks about protecting the consumer. In countries with a low rate of inflation, controlling prices is more a question of regulation at the distribution level. However in countries such as Turkey where price increases are determined by economic decisions taken at a governmental level, the issue of consumer protection assumes new dimensions.

In such countries and as in the case of the economic measures of 24 January, prices are allowed to rise on the pretext that "prices should be determined independently" while wages are artificially frozen. This results in the upset of any existing balance between prices and income.

Immediately following the economic measures of 24 January, prices of basic necessities affecting the lives of millions of people have increased from between one and a half to six times. To argue that there has been a decrease in the rate of price increases during subsequent periods is not very impressive from a standpoint of consumers who have had their wages practically frozen for a long period of time. The reason for this is that the decrease in the rate of price increases came along at a time when prices had already reached levels that could not be borne by consumers.

Millions of people in Turkey do not have the opportunity of expressing themselves on the matter of the award received by Ozal. Turkey has no strong consumer organizations, and political parties which could serve as important instruments to express public opinion have had their activities banned along with other institutions. But those who have read books concerning the development of capitalism in Europe following the Industrial Revolution, understand very well the plight of the people who in those days had left their lands to come to work in the cities. Humanity recalls that in those days the founders of capitalism had demanded "production and still more production." However, that era is now

recalled as the period of "savage capitalism," as a time when capitalism could toss aside a human being as if discarding a piece of paper.

A century has passed since the era of savage capitalism. As we approach the year 2000, it is shameful to select as "economist of the year" a man who is trying to impose upon the masses conditions from that long gone era.

If anything, it is the Turkish people that should be chosen economist of the year as it attempts to pursue its existence under such difficult conditions.

9491

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POLITICAL AUSTRIA

INCREASING TROUBLES FOR KREISKY'S NEAR EAST POLICY

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 13 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Anneliese Rohrer: "Arafat Is Causing Difficulties in Domestic Politics--How Will Kreisky Get Out Of the Dilemma?"]

[Text] "The scope of the federal chancellor's politics is defined by the KRONEN-ZEITUNG headline the following day and the date of the next election. He has no use for anything more profound." This, in essence, is what a middle-generation Socialist said in private conversation a short time ago. A reminder occurred a few days later when the headline read "Kreisky Breaks With Arafat." Only after a remarkable delay of some days, had Brumo Kreisky decided, after all, with this dissociation to reflect the mood in the SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party] and probably also among the people as a whole.

Events followed one another in rapid succession last week, and there is every indication that within the SPOe the limit of what could be tolerated in the question of the Middle East was reached. Too much had happened at the same time. As late as Tuesday, the chancellor had mourned at length the assassination of his personal friend Anwar al-Sadat but had not found any words condemning the jubilation, also already known, on the part of his friend PLO chief Yasir Arafat over the very same assassination.

A few hours later Minister of the Interior Erwin Lanc, unequivocally for the time being, identified Municipal Councilor Comrade Heinz Nittel as a victim of the federal government's—in other words, the chancellor's—Middle East policy with his dramatic announcement that the arrested synagogue assassin Palestinian Husham Rajih had murdered Nittel. Whereas before that step on the part of Lanc it had been at least still conceivable to support all the other theories about what was behind the murder of Nittel, "the evidence," as it were, now showed that "one of us" (as Kreisky said in May) would have to die over Austria's PLO policy.

In the SPOe itself, the negative reaction to Kreisky's attitude had already ceased to be curbed in the days following the attack on the Vienna synagogue in August. Particularly in leading OeGB [Austrian Trade Union Federation] circles, vociferous statements of dissociation had been made when Kreisky had sharply attacked Israel immediately after the attack. Minister of the Interior Lanc at that time, in a DIE PRESSE interview, gave a brief glimpse of the real mood in the SPOe when he said that he "like hardly anyone else in the party" fully supported the chancellor's Middle East policy.

But the sum total of events—the murder of Nittel, the attempted arms smuggle at Schwechat Airport and the hasty expulsion of the Arabs arrested at that time, the role played by PLO representative Ghazi Husayn who kept making it known at Vienna cocktail parties that he could hardly cope any longer with the chancellor's constant contacts, the synagogue attack and now the "incomprehensible" jubilation by the PLO over Sadat's death—all that had now become too great an intraparty and domestic political liability.

Already shortly after Sadat's death a week before, leading SPOe politicians had pointed out "that the people out there" simply found Arafat's jubilation "incomprehensible" and that it would now be even more difficult to make them understand the past Middle East line. Moreover, it was pointed out, Kreisky during the wave of horror at the death of Sadat, mourned everywhere as a hero of peace, could not outline or explain his real opinion about the failure of Sadat's efforts. It simply was necessary to give a sign.

In the SPOe the fact is no longer being disputed at all that as a result of the events of the past few months Austrian foreign policy concerning the crisis area of the Middle East has reached an almost insoluble dilemma. It is being said that the policy is right—that is, peace in the Middle East, if at all, can be achieved only by including the PLO—but that the understanding for this within the country is decreasing all the time. Therefore the belatedly announced "consequences"—for the time being, no official PLO representative in Vienna and hardly any contact with Arafat—are also primarily meant for the internal use of domestic politics.

8790

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

FRANCOPHONE SOCIALISTS HOLD PRE-ELECTION CONGRESS

Events at Congress

Brussels LE PEUPLE in French 5 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by C.L. and D.C.--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The PS [Flemish Socialist Party] held an important congress yesterday morning at the Rayon de Soleil at Montigny-le-Tilleul, during which the broad lines of the party's campaign platform were to be ratified, and the consensus reached by the party's different factions, which unanimously supported the speech made by the party president, Guy Spitaels, was to be consolidated. We note that this congress was held under the dual chairmanship of Ernest Glinne and Francoise Gadenne, as the party wanted to show by the presence of a woman in a position such as the vice-presidency that it wants to move closer to those whom in the past it has all too often tended to neglect.

A large crowd of party militants was present, and after the opening formalities Guy Spitael's very substantive speech took the congress rapidly to the heart of the matter.

The PS president analyzed the overall political, social and economic situation, which led him to define the possible orientations of the country's future political structure and, quite naturally, to defend the federalist option which the party has espoused since 1947, as Guy Spitaels pointed out.

The Socialist-Christian Socialist coalition had to break down, said Guy Spitaels, because of two overriding causes: the drift to the Right of the Social Christian Party, and the perpetual community conflict.

The PSC [Christian Social Party-French] and the CVP [Christian People's Party-Dutch] have since the new year began embarked on a drift to the right, the orator said, a drift illustrated by several important events: the PSC congress at Floreffe, which threw into question the progressive policy of the government, the silence in which the Christian Democratic wing of the PSC (largely dominated by CEPIC [Political Center of Christian Independents and Cadres]) is plunged, the prime minister's contacts with the liberals and the Christian Socialist offensive against the budgetary decisions of 6 August.

With respect to the community conflict, the deterioration in relations between the parties crystallized around six explosive issues: the regionalization of administration, the future of Brussels, nominations for the Belgian Foreign Trade Office (the Monfils affair), defense of the Walloon aviation industry, issues that are smoldering in various sectors and the steel industry fight.

Guy Spitaels forcefully pointed out in that connection that the Christian Socialist policy was one of sabotage, particularly with respect to Brussels, of bad faith, of conducting a war of nerves: the Monfils affair, for example, having led to a CVP reprisal targeted against the Savings Bank, an institution which has 8,000 agents and manages 800 billion [Belgian francs] and which still does not have a board of directors!

The PS president, however, acknowledged that the final straw was of course the steel industry question. Here it was a story of nothing but obstruction and delays, and increasing inequity in the treatment given the North and the South.

/"The political reality has certainly been one of two separate financial paths, to the detriment of the steel industry in Liege and Charleroi,"/ said Guy Spitaels in summarizing.

Specific Objectives

/"It was all of this together which led by on 13 September, in my debate against Mr Tindemans, to ask the question: 'Would it not be better for each to be master in his own house?'", /the orator explained, thus getting around to the matter of defining the party's economic and social objectives.

Then he discussed the socialist commitment to defending indexation, to the preservation of a positive social climate in businesses and in the cities, based on real social justice and solidarity among all citizens.

Guy Spitaels rejected any cutbacks in social security and pleaded for preservation of the linkage between welfare benefits to the consumer price index and to well-being.

On the subject of taxes, the PS president insisted on the fact that his party does not want to increase the tax burden but wants more social justice. What the socialists denounce, he said, is the obvious complacency with which large-scale organized fraud is viewed.

As for lowering the costs of doing business, he pointed out that one of the factors which urgently needed attention was the cost of energy, a problem regarding which the Belgian state had shown itself incapable of producing a coherent policy. And, in order to protect small and medium sized businesses from the discrimination of which they are the victim, Guy Spitaels called for regulation of financial intermediaties, particularly in connection with the exodus of capital and with tax fraud.

Restoration of Federalism

After an interesting summary of the road traveled by the PS in search of a trilateral federalism, and after noting the current paralysis of the Belgian state, Guy Spitaels emphasized the fact that naturally the party would have to go back to its initial options of trilateral federalism.

/"The PS is presently the only one of the major francophone parties,"/ he stressed deftly, /"to unequivocally support a Brussels region, in opposition to the PSC and the PRL [Liberal Republican Par.y-Walloon], which call for merging the Walloon region with the French community, thereby pointing toward a bilateral federalism."/

Guy Spitaels next defined the five major principles for the protection of Brussels, principles from which the PS, he said, will not depart: Brussels must be endowed with institutions and powers to which it is entitled by the Constitution; it must have the same powers and organs as the other regions; its unique financial problems will have to be taken into account; there can be no partial solutions to the problem of Brussels, which excludes the unilateral offer of guarantees to the Flemish people in the Brussels region without an overall solution to the Brussels problem.

We note that at this point in his speech, Guy Spitaels was warmly applauded by the members from the Brussels federation.

From Federalism to Autonomy

The PS president then set about deciding what should be understood by the notion of federalism. It certainly must not go as far as autonomy or independence, he said. Federalism as the PS sees it should be along the lines of the federalism practiced by Germany or Canada, which consists in allowing the provinces themselves to manage their economic resources without jeopardizing the security of the state, foreign affairs or the currency.

The question for the PS is one of deciding on a basic line of action, without necessarily going into the streets or engaging in sterile negotiations.

The PS president went on naturally to appeal broadly to women and men of the Left, whether they be secular or /Christian,/ without however falling into the same mistake as the CVP, namely monopolizing power.

/"Those who come join us will be fraternally welcomed; we do not claim any monopoly and we know that tomorrow we will have to join forces. Our French community will not accept any 'diktat,'"/ was Spitaels' forceful conclusion, which was greeted with warm and long applause by an audience which was entirely won over and determined to take action on the basis of common and progressive goals and in an environment of newly restored unity.

Other Speakers

The first speaker after Guy Spitaels was the deputy mayor of Charleroi, Emile Henri, who is president of the Union of Municipalities and Communities. Henri spoke on the question of appropriations for the communities, which at this time are biased in favor of the municipalities with Christian Socialist majorities.

In Emile Henri's opinion, federalism must bring more stability to community government, which through management in depth is in accordance with socialist options.

Guy Cudell, on behalf of the Brussels federation of the PS, endorsed the decisions made by President Spitaels, particularly the option of trilateral federalism, permitting Brussels to remain a full-fledged region.

Guy Coeme, secretary of state for the Walloon region, denounced the current water policy which favors Flanders. He also urged protection of Walloon's water. G. Coeme also spoke on protection of the environment. People as young as 18 years of age will be voting on 8 November. They are sensitive to environmental considerations. It is important for these kinds of problems to be among the party's basic concerns.

In the opinion of Jean-Maurice Dehousse, minister of the Walloon region, there is a real need to come up with solutions for Walloon and Brussels that will help sustain both of those communities. Also, he stressed the repeated interventions of the Walloon region to help communities facing catastrophic financial problems. This shows the importance of the region having sufficient resources to enable it to carry out the responsibilities which have been entrusted to it. He also denounced the sabotage which has prevented implementation of the August 1980 parliamentary bill on this subject.

Anne-Marie Lizin, a deputy in the European Assembly, expressed her concern about the status of the Walloon steel industry, whose productive capacity is periodically threatened. Etienne Davignon deplored the fact that the European Commission barely 2 days ago, in the course of an official meeting, had defended the idea of returning to a definition of productive capacity that would be injurious to the Walloon steel industry. One is in any case astonished that this should come from a Belgian commissioner.

She also declared her support for the decriminalization of abortion and for a policy of bilateral disarmament.

Jacques Yerna spoke primarily about procedural questions. While he may agree with Guy Spitael's presentation, he feels nevertheless that the campaign platform the bureau is going to articulate implies some political choices. He asks, therefore, that these choices not be made solely by the bureau, but rather that as many militants as possible participate. He also asks, therefore, that at a minimum a general council be convoked to debate the campaign platform and take positions on the subject.

"There Is Nothing But Well-Being"

On behalf of Socialist Youth, Mr Bartholmoe presented the position of youth. He also spoke of the future, which is in their hands. And he concluded by firmly

supporting the position taken by various speakers in support of decriminalizing abortion.

Senator Jacques Hoyaux chaired the committee responsible for drawing up the resolution of the Socialist Federation of Charleroi; he explained its general cutlines. In this way the Charleroi Federation showed its support of moral values, education and continuing education.

/"Well-being is necessary,"/ said Jacques Hoyaux; /"but it is not enough!"/

He also spoke /against/ the rekindling of a policy of rearmament and /for/ balanced and generalized disarmament. Regarding internal policy, the senator from Charleroi insisted on continual and unbroken firmness, rejecting the thought of getting mired down in dilatory procedures, in the effort to rapidly bring about achievement of the goal of a Walloon political authority that would be efficienty organized and have adequate financial resources at its disposal.

The following speaker spoke on behalf of South Luxembourg, whose economic and social problems are especially sharp.

/"I recognize,"/ he said, /"that we have always been able to count on the help of the socialist ministers, but that has not been enough to restimulate employment, for we have seen a series of obstructions coming from Christian Socialists in the government."/

After crossing swords on behalf of the public industrial initiative, the speaker concluded by approving the fact that the electoral campaign would be based on defense of the steel industry, but regretted the fact that South Luxembourg has been waiting for years for a solution to its problems.

Pillory The Right

Next came the turn of the representative of socialists from Belgium's Germanophone community.

/"The new Article 59,"/ he said, /"has still not been passed. The efforts of the PS in this matter have not been crowned with success. The next parliament must immediately move ahead with the revision of Article 59."/

In the view of that speaker, membership of the German language community in the Walloon region is the sine qua non to achievement of an effective economic and social policy.

/"We are counting heavily on the full support of the PS in the efforts we are making,"/ he concluded.

B. Pierunek, of the Mons-Borinage Federation, issued forth with an imposing indictment of the Right, which is not in the least concerned with salvaging Walloon, which believes the workers are making too much and that the jobless are profiteers, and which is blocking regionalization. If the policies of the

Right are followed, social advances will be squeezed out before the measures it calls for bring about some hypothetical economic recovery. In the opinion of the Mons-Borinage militant, the current electoral compaign is not simply a repetition of previous campaigns. The hour of decision has come, and it is essential to win by a large majority in Walloon.

/"Our platform,"/ he continued, /"must be a veritable contract with the citizen."/

The citizen, moreover, must be given a voice through the successful democratization of political, economic and social life.

This ended the series of speakers. Ernest Glinne then gave the floor to Guy Cudell, for the reading of the proposed resolution, after mentioning that the bureau would examine on Tuesday Jacques Yerna's proposal to submit the campaign platform to a general council for approval.

Several amendments were offered, including amendments by Herve Brouhon, Jean-Maurice Dehausse, Irene Petry (who wanted the resolution to be less specific on the federalist option in order to leave the bureau more flexible in its decisions), and the representative of the Germanophone socialists. These observations were largely taken into account, and as a result the resolution was adopted unanimously with one abstention (that of Irene Petry). The text is published below.

Congress Resolutions

Brussels LE PEUPLE in French 5 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] The Congress of the Socialist Party met 4 October 1981 at Montignies-le-Tilleul, under the chairmanship of Ernest Glinne and Françoise Gadenne.

After hearing the report by Guy Spitaels, president of the Socialist Party, [the Congress:]

--noted the drift to the Right of the Christian Socialist family of parties and all the obstructions that led to the resignation of the government, especially:

-- the manifest determination of the PSC/CVP to support continual community conflict by refusing to respect commitments made;

-- the refusal of these parties to come to a solution on a number of issues vital to the future of our regions, among them regionalization of administration, the problem of Brussels and the steel industry.

Noting

--that the Walloon steel industry, just like the collieries of Campine, should benefit from the totality of assistance called for in the 1978 reconversion plan, with the objectives of assuring an installed productive capacity of 8.5 million tons, job protection and restored competitiveness;

- --that the party is opposed to any policy which would harm the workers by threatening the linkage of their wages to the [consumer price] index; or by attacking social security, especially by reducing social outlays for the most impoverished;
- -- that a simplification of tax regulations and effective policing of large-scale fraud would make the tax system more just;
- --that a revitalization of industry does not imply a reduction in the standard of living, but rather more effective management and a reduction of energy costs--by rational utilization and a reorientation of energy sources--for which the PS has called for 2 years now, without obtaining an answer from the central government;
- --that the Brussels region must without delay be given the institutions and authority to which it is entitled under the Constitution just like the other two regions, taking into account, however, the provisional character of its current geographic boundaries.

In the same spirit, the problem of Fourons must be handled, with respect for the wishes of the people concerned.

UNDER THESE CONDITIONS CALLS FOR

/--a federalization of the Belgian state by the acquisition of national powers./

The current regionalization should be completed and strengthened, especially by expanding jurisdiction into five hitherto national sectors (the steel industry, textiles, coal, molded glass, and naval construction and repairs), into the whole domain of energy policy, into research grants for industry, agriculture and major infrastructure, especially port infrastructure;

/-- the creation of a strong, regionalized public credit sector,/ indispensable for the financing of any economic and industrial activities in the regions.

- --rejection of the assimilation of the Walloon and Brussels regions into a French community which must hold onto its uniqueness but without infringing on the legitimate aspirations of the two regions which compose it, particularly their right to exist.
- --giving each community responsibility for organizing its own educational system;
- /-- the unequivocal defense of the uniqueness of the Brussels region and the Germanophone community;/

/--a union of the Walloon and Brussels Left,/ both secular and Christian, in order to create the political conditions for change, with concern for fairness and respect for each side's philosophical commitments.

In this spirit of solidarity and fraternity, the Socialist Party intends to work resolutely to keep alive the hopes for the future of our regions and our communities.

In the same spirit, the party intends to give priority to the goal of re-absorbing unemployment, especially among youth and women.

The Congress of the Socialist Party which was held at Montigny-le-Tilleul on 4 October 1981 adopted the following resolutions:

The Congress is concerned about the resumption of legal proceedings against women and doctors who have practiced abortion under appropriate medical conditions, and declares its solidarity with them.

It wants the party to pursue its struggle for the decriminalization of abortion to a successful conclusion.

The Congress, saddened by the upsurge of policies and statements supporting the pursuit of a policy of worldwide rearmament,

--raises its voice against such a waste of effort, financial resources and raw materials;

--reaffirms its conviction of the need for universal and balanced disarmament and belief in the priority of a policy of social and human development;

--calls on its militants and supporters to participate massively in the big demonstration 25 October in Brussels. [The PS federal secretaries will give detailed instructions on this subject).

9516

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POLITICAL BELGIUM

CAMPAIGN DEVELOPMENTS IN FLANDERS VIEWED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 22 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Jacques van Hoorebeke: "In Flanders, The CVP Is Flirting With The Liberals To The Benefit of Socialists And The Volksunie"]

[Text] In Flanders, two parties currently stand out: the CVP [Christian People's Party] and the PVV [Party of Peace and Progress]. Leo Tindemans' party is trying to gain new credibility by blaming the Walloon Socialists entirely for the current crisis and presenting a much more liberal platform than in the past.

Willy De Clercq's PVV is hoping to become the second largest party of Flanders this time. In the outgoing parliament, the CVP had 57 seats, the SP [Dutch-language Socialist Party] had 26 seats and the PVV, 22. The Flemish Socialists are somewhat traumatized by the regional emphasis which their elder brother, the PS [French-language Socialist Party] has given the campaign. In this connection, it is striking to note that the three traditional parties are ignoring institutional problems. Their attitude should help the Volksunie.

In Flanders (as elsewhere in the country) parties are realizing how little prestige they have with the public. This is particularly true of the CVP which has been in power for 25 years.

Presenting his campaign platform, Tindemans told us that he still drew crowds to his meetings but he was struck by his listeners' skepticism and the type of questions asked. "People no longer believe in politics," he told us.

Liberal Ideas in the "JET" Plan

The CVP campaign platform has been named the "JET" plan. The three letters stand for youth, economy and the future. This plan stresses the economic problems in particular. It is distinguished from previous ones by its marked turn toward liberal ideas. The CVP in particular would modify our index system and proposed a series of measures: public financing reform, a tax cut for companies and transformation of economic expansion laws.

This plan which can be "accepted or rejected"--and the CVP says it is not afraid of an opposition plan--does not seem to be very negotiable with the socialists. On the other hand, with the liberals, "there would be ways to negotiate," we were told, "although differences exist, especially about a tax cut by allowing married couples to file separate returns ["decumul"] and the famous revenue sharing." For the liberals, the Social-Christians are ready to water down their program in many respects. The liberal wind blowing over the CVP seems to have convinced even its most influential left-wing members. Deputy Jan Lenssens, considered the leader of the ACW (MOC [Christian Workers Movement]) in parliament said in an interview with "Spectator" (Democrat-Christian weekly) that "a member of parliament who primarily defends the workers' interests will have a greater margin for maneuver in a government with the liberals than in a government with the socialists."

The 1982 Budget: The Slate Is Erased

The CVP has another problem in future negotiations: the 1982 budget, an explosive subject if ever there was one but one rarely discussed during this entire campaign. "For the moment, the slate is erased," said one observer from Two Churches Street. "However, things must be very clearly spelled out before the CVP forms a government. Thus, negotiations might last a long time as in Holland. All the i's must be dotted and we must know where we are going. Otherwise, the country will go bankrupt."

De Clercq disagrees totally with such a procedure. He believes on the contrary that one must move very quickly. "The country can no longer wait," he said. "If there is agreement on some fundamental major principles, a government can be formed very quickly."

He acknowledged, moreover, the liberal ideas in the CVP plan, "but," he hastened to add, "a party which helped socialize the economy of the country, whose preferred ally has always been the PS, which has continually increased the state's control in all areas, is this a credible party? If the CVP want to become liberal, I am the first to rejoice."

Pacifistic Socialists

The liberal drift in the Social-Christian ranks should, in one way, help Flemish Socialists. The SP could attract part of the Democrat-Christian left. In an interview with "Links" ["The Left"], Freddy Willockx, SP minister of the PTT [Posts, Telephone and Telegraph] said: "The problem of our political life is that with the PVV, we know with whom we are dealing; this is never clear with the CVP: it publicizes empty slogans, offers no alternative and is largely responsible for the loss of credibility in politics."

Yet Karel Van Miert's party seems somewhat shaken by the avant-garde positions taken by the Walloon Socialists on regional matters. He fears a backlash. Thus, he tries to reassure the troops by saying: I do not want to be Spitaels' errand boy and I never will be!"

The platform of the Flemish Socialists stands out from the other Flemish parties' in certain ways which attract youth. This is the "Van Miert phenomenon" which we discovered in recent reporting on Flanders. (See in particular "Le Soir" of 25 October 1980 and 14 March 1981.) Attracted by events in West Germany, Van Miert is in fact advocating clearly pacifistic positions on rearmament. He opposes missiles and the neutron bomb. He says he also is against the purchase of the new American F-16 planes. The recent, similarly negative statement by the Flemish interdiocesan pastoral council on the matter disturbs the CVP greatly; the latter issued a communique which, to say the least, was awkward.

The SP emphasizes "an offensive policy for recovery" in economic and social matters. It says it is ready to discuss the index but on the condition there are certain guarantees in other areas.

The Parties' Silence on Government Reforms

The three major Flemish parties are strangely discreet, if not completely silent about regional matters. The PVV platform, for example, does not mention it. When asked about this omission, the chairman only said: "We must eat dinner before dessert." By their discretion, the old-line parties want to show that they are not getting involved, so they tell us, in the regional powerplay unleashed by the PS in the steel matter first and then about the Flemish School at Comines next. This strategy of the political giants does not prevent the Flemish papers from headlining, day after day-with pathos-all the trials and tribulations of the fate of the Comines school. The Volksunie should benefit on election day.

This also allows Dr Anciaux's party to take more radical positions and call now more than ever for the formation of a Flemish nation.

Among the small parties which will try their luck on 8 November 1981, there is the Communist Party which has never gotten off the ground in Flanders. As in 1978, the Flemish Block which won one seat is on the ballot, as is "Agalev," the ecology movement. The RAD [Respect for Work and Democracy], the Flemish equivalent of the UDRT [Democratic Union for Respect of Labor], a single party with a common platform for the whole country has put up candidates in most districts. The antitax party still does not appear to have enough resources except in the south of the country.

9479

CSO: 3100/76

'SPIEGEL' REPORT ON DECLINE OF SPD IN CITIES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 Oct 81 pp 26-29, 31-32

[Article: "The Trend Is Comrade No More"]

[Text] When Social Democrat Herbert Schmalstieg, chief mayor of Hannover, left his house at 10 pm Sunday before last to go to City Hall, all did not seem lost yet.

Whereas, the news about the trend of the results of the Lower Saxony municipal elections had indicated heavy losses for the SPD, results had yet to come in from the workers' districts of the capital—Linden, Ricklingen and Misburg—where the Social Democrats had virtually always obtained 65 percent of the vote.

Soon thereafter all hopes were dashed. In the city from where Kurt Schumacher had rebuilt the SPD after the war, where Noske and Ollenhauer had pursued their politics, the Linden workers too were now abandoning the party. The losses amounted to 10.9 percent, and the vote for the 29th mandate which would have insured Schmalstieg's reelection in advance, fell 700 votes short in the end. The SPD had obtained 43.2 percent of the vote, the CDU 42.4 percent.

In Hannover, where since 1954 the Social Democrats had never yet received less than 50 percent of the vote, there now suddenly was a tie with the CDU, while four council seats went to the FDP and another four to the Greens. "What was I supposed to do?" Schmalstieg asked himself at a loss—and did "nothing at all."

Yet, sensational though the decline in votes looks, the comrades long since ought to have got used to this misfortune, for on the FRG electoral map Hannover by now is no more than one spot among many.

For years the cities have been areas where the SPD suffered losses. At the places where politics are supposed to be closest to the heart of the citizen and where the Social Democrats traditionally had appeared to be at home, red city halls were changing their color one after another.

Some big municipalties slipped from the Social Democrats' hands—such as the Bavarian capital, Munich, where at one time Vogel had resided with 77.9 percent of the vote but where 3 years ago, when the SPD candidate managed to get a mere 39.2 percent, the CSU's man, Erich Kiesel, came to power, with the CSU, gaining an absolute majority at the municipal council elections.

Or take Frankfurt, where in 1977 "dynamite Rudi" Arndt had to make way for the Christian Democrat Walter Wallmann and where this year the SPD, which at one time had enjoyed an absolute majority, lost another 5.9 percent, obtaining 34 percent of the vote.

In May the CDU was victorious in Berlin, which had been in Social Democratic hands virtually without interruption since Ernst Reuter's times. A mere 38.3 percent had been left over of the downright dream total of 61.9 percent Willy Brandt had obtained there.

Duesseldorf, capital of North Rhine-Westphalia, was lost as long as 2 years ago. There the SPD only barely missed getting 50 percent, and with a substantial 47.6 percent Christian Democrat Kuerten relieved the SPD's Bungert as chief mayor. In Stuttgart Social Democrat Peter Conradi was defeated by Manfred Rommel, son of the marshall.

But it was not only in the big cities that the SPD went downhill; smaller cities too, one after the other, came under the supervision of the CDU. In Offenbach in Hesse, the Social Democrats in the 1977 municipal elections slipped from 56.2 to 44.1 percent, while the CDU added 12.9 percent and won, and in Wiesbaden it dropped from 50.8 to 40.6 percent, with the CDU gaining an absolute majority.

Unrestricted domination was also wrested from the comrades in numerous large Bavarian municipalities. For example, in Regensburg in 1978 only just 36.6 percent remained of the 52.7 percent which the Social Democrats had received in 1966.

And one after another, they sometimes simply could not grasp what was going on. Becoming metaphysical, CDU Land chief Alfred Dregger could not regard the SPD disaster as anything but "a miracle, simply a miracle." As far as Social Democrat Freidhelm Farthmann, minister of labor in North Rhine-Westphalia was concerned, what had happened just was not credible: "Surely these liberal cities open to the world should be our strongholds."

In those places where the fortresses are stll being held, things are also already aflame. In Cologne, for instance, where the SPD predominated in the municipal assembly with a sure 57.4 percent in 1964, the advantage over the CDU has shrunk to per mills. In Kassel the comrades after their poor result in the municipal elections last March had to form a coalition with the Greens to stay in power.

With dramatic rescue actions, Bonn headquarters is trying to help the party friends in jeopardy. If previously Social Democratic municipal heroes who, like Willy Brandt or Jochen Vogel, had gained a reputation in their municipality had gone to Bonn to assume higher offices, they now have returned to the emaciated urban parties again.

Hamburg, where the SPD is in a considerable crisis, is to be defended by former State and Education Minister Klaus von Dohnanyi against the CDU's smart Leisler-Kiep. The rescue trip by Bonn Justice Minister Vogel has already failed: He was unable to hold Berlin against CDU politician von Weizsaecker.

"In municipal elections it becomes clear what a party still possesses in the way of electoral substance," says Manfred Guellner, formerly with Infas [Institute for Applied Social Sciences] in Godesberg and now director of the Statistical Office in Cologne, and joint author with Comrade Ursula Loeffler of a study about "SPD and the City."

And indeed there are quite a number of indications that the SPD's Guellner is right when he says that a "waning municipal electoral confidence in the SPD, by way of a trend, also means weaker Bundestag election results." An advance or standstill on the part of society, bethinking oneself or wanting reforms—all this generally manifests itself first in the cities. And it is there that social adversities are first reflected in disgruntlement, whether it is a case of unemployment or health care, school problems or transport constraints.

If that is reflected in the vote, it amounts to a great deal, for about one-third of all FRG citizens live in 68 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. And fewer and fewer of these are governed locally by the SPD; the trend is not a comrade anymore. According to a challenge issued by Baden-Wuerttemberg Land Chairman Ulrich Lang, one needs "to newly discover the priority of municipal politics."

It is time this were done, the chances are, for in quite a number of cases the debacle of Social Democratic municipal government can be traced back tens of years.

The extent of voters abandoning the Social Democrats is documented by adding up the municipal election results in the cities. The SPD advantage over the CDU and CSU, which in the mid-sixties amounted to a robust 23.1 percent, has shrunk to 6.3 percent—a swing of the pendulum of 16.8 toward the CDU and CSU. According to election expert Guellner, "things are going downhill almost automatically as far as the party is concerned."

In Berlin and Frankfurt, where elections have been held this year, this swing has been downright dramatic. In the sixties the Berlin Social Democrats were 33.1 percent ahead of the CDU, and the Frankfurters 22.4 percent. Now the CDU leads in Berlin by 9.5 percent, and in Frankfurt by as much as 20.2 percent—a shift of 42.6 percent in all in favor of the Christian Democrats in about 15 years.

Despite all this, one does not hear a lively debate about the question as to why the party which at one time took a stand for politics that have a direct bearing on everyday questions, and scored by far the greatest electoral victories as a result, now finds itself at the losing end in this very field.

What is indisputable is that national and Land politics—and, in the final analysis, also the ideological frictions in West German society—play a role in municipal elections. Like all politicians in inclement weather, the chief mayor of Saarbruecken, SPD National Executive member Oskar Lafontaine, blames the city losses primarily on the "overall political situation." And Herbert Schmalstieg too thinks this has now been confirmed again—for instance, by that "summer spectable" in the Bonn coalition, "which took an impossible course."

Social Democrat Guellner, on the other hand, is convinced that in the past 10 years only "the coupling of municipal elections with Landtag and Bundestag elections has prevented a lowering of the SPD share." He says: If purely municipal elections

had been held in Hannover in the seventies, the SPD losses and CDU gains would have become apparent before 27 September." And even Schmalstieg does not simply want to dismiss the idea that it is not by any means just those at the top that are always to be blamed for every misfortune in the municipalities. "The SPD became big in the cities," he says, "but since the time that it began to be responsible for the federal government, it has pushed municipal politics into the background."

SPD Senator for Science in Bremen Horst Werner Franke refuses to believe that in heavy weather in Bonn the cities also find themselves going downhill. "We are also wondering about it," he comments on the municipal horror figures," and I find that the reasoning according to which we have to pay for the discontent in Bonn is simplistic."

The SPD senator thinks he is noticing a "sociopsychological occurrence"--with the people perhaps being gripped "in part by a kind of fear for their life and existence and either not voting at all or voting conservative."

Many analyses suggest that it is primarily the SPD that is hit by abstention from voting in municipal elections, which in any case generally suffer from small voters' participation--particularly since the workers, who continue to provide essential SPD support in the cities, tend to abstain from voting.

This, however, does not explain the SPD city electoral losses that have been going on for decades, any more than does the appearance of the Greens. No doubt these are increasing the trend, but they did not exist at a time when Social Democratic majorities and mayor's posts already were being lost one after another.

And long before existential fears occupied the minds of as many citizens as they do these days, did strata of voters quarrel with the SPD without whom that party cannot rule either in th cities or in the country.

Social changes in big municipalities have been causing trouble for the Social Democrats in all municipal elections in the past 10 years. In so-called service centers such as Hamburg, Bremen, Munich, Cologne, Hannover, Duesseldorf, Stuttgart and Frankfurt, already between 1950 and 1970 the workers' share had dropped from 50 to 37.7 percent, while the quota of white-collar employees and civil servants had risen from 34.9 to 52.3 percent.

In the beginning this did not do any harm to the SPD. On the contrary. Specialists and middle-class people who had made it as well as young climbers and women were the ones who nationwide "in the early seventies caused the most movement in the SPD," according to Klaus Liepelt, the head of the Institute for Applied Social Sciences close to the SPD.

But judging by the particularly high SPD losses in almost all service centers, it appears that this potential increasingly is refusing to deliver in municipal elections. As Social Democrat Guellner explains, the social changes, as a result of "modified claims and levels of expectations as regards communal care," are having a greater effect on municipal elections than on "grand policy."

It may well be that voters of tha ilk also react more strongly to the checkered war scenes presented by the Social Democrats in important big municipalities. In Munich, for instance, a fierce dispute between right and left raged for 7 years.

Top man Vogel finally left the "system changers" and went to Bonn, and under leftwing Rudolf Schoefberger, subdistrict chairman at the time, they then went after the remaining "replete curbstone setters' wisdom of veteran municipal politicians."

The Munich SPD has gone through five executives since 1969, and the present federal executive manager, Peter Glotz, did not manage either "to wrest the knives away from those opposing one another."

The Cologne Social Democrats kept the voters' interest awake in a similar manner in the last decade. At one time the rightwing was victorious and simply dissolved the subdistrict executive of the Juso's [Young Socialists]. Then, in 1973, the leftwing suddenly supplied 29 or 30 delegates at a district party congrss. A little later the rightwing of the party started a successful comeback under subdistrict chief Guenter Herterich. "Now comes the whip," the chairman called to his oppoinents among his party comrades, while these considered "Comrade Herterich to be a crocodile."

Moreover untoward goings-on among party officials brought discredit on the party. "The SPD in Cologne no longer was interested in anything but themselves," a Duesseldorf government member sums it up; "everything was in a turmoil."

Turbulence has also shaken the comrades in Berlin in the past 10 years. When after the building of the wall the situation had normalized and the citizens found out that they were living in quite an ordinary city, it became apparent that something of a mutual-benefit society had made itself at home in the comfortable rooms of this municipality.

Social Democratic officials were playing checkers with jobs and projects. Bureau-cratization was putting in an appearance. Municipal scandals and mismanagement damaged the image of the party, and the SPD became the subject of conversation when it was a question of bankruptcies in the millions, such as that of the Steglitz Kreisel and, finally, of the Graski scandal, where pledges were bandied about and which brought down Mayor Stobbe.

Surely the Social Democrats also overdid it with large-scale building projects in Frankfurt--an ugly proliferating concrete district where, on top of it, the SPD had a hand in the demolition of venerable houses and their replacement by dull office high-rises. SPD politicians were gaining a reputation of making common cause with land speculators. Chief Mayor Arndt with his idea of blowing up the Opera ruin acquired the nickname "dynamite Rudi" and then, after all, made reconstruction plans--which his successor, Wallmann, with a lot of money but to the delight of many Frankfurters, has now put into practice.

When the shirtsleeves mayor finally also began getting interested in the "outlines of old townscapes," with modern facades in historical surroundings affecting him "like myself as the second from the right in a fairy ballet," it was too late. An exaggerated school reform in Hesse and a handful of scandals in which Social Democrats were involved had done additional harm to the party and apparently had primarily frightened the city population.

This was the kind of poor impression the SPD was making in many places at a time when city government became increasingly difficult and the term ungovernability made the rounds. Liabilities in the residential environment and commuting, problems with children or with old people, less money and more bureaucracy—"in the tangible details," Karl Ganser, Social Democratic professor and urban planner in the Duesseldorf Land government says sarcastically, "the brilliance of * 2 grand perspective took flight."

It was worse. Often it turned out that Social Democrats, to whom the postwar citizen above all had conceded competency in practical municipal work, were not doing so well in coping with tangible details either.

As SPD analyst Guellner says, "the basic needs of the masses" were ignored, and "the needs of minorities among the members" were raised to the status of a guiding idea. Guellner tries to demonstrate this as far as automobile traffic is concerned, which is in bad repute among many Social Democrats. He says the SPD must "take note of the fact that at present the automobile in the consciousness of the broad electoral strata continues to be regarded as a very positive expansion of mobility both as far as work and as far as leisure is concerned. The rich certainly find it easier to do without a car than the poor."

While "avoiding environment-destroying excesses," Guellner warns, one must "continue to insure the use of a car by Social Democratic voters." By "merely following a strategy of ingratiating oneself" with the Greens, "not only quite a few regular Social Democratic voters among the workers" are scared away "but also many middle-class voters."

Along this line Mainz SPD Municipal Councilor Klaus Rein says that "political majorities too deserve to be respected." Altogether, says critic Guellner, the party has lost contact with the citizen in the cities, and thus also lost sight of his true concerns. Increasingly the municipal SPD is "occupying itself with illusory problems of the social superstructure."

It does appear possible that the break in the membership structure of the SFD, the competition between the teachers' generation and the comrades attending to the routine party work to push each other out of the way, has been damaging to the commitment for everyday affairs.

Mainze Chief Mayor Jockel Fuchs now is "shocked" that local party bodies are "increasingly occupied with overriding questions" at a time when the citizen "often has quite different worries"--for example, about "when at long last the sports arena or the school will be completed." Formerly, complains Karl Trabalski, member of the executive of the Duesseldorf SPD, "Care for old people and education were debated in the local party," whereas "today the subject is the SS 20." He says: "We have been in every theater of war, but we have not concerned ourselves enough with local issues."

Meanwhile it is clearly apparent that there are Social Democratic misgivings about the fact that the comrades in many places hardly care about whether there will be a letup in the crisis concerning the disposal of nuclear waste but instead now only debate such momentous subjects as detente with the East.

On behalf of the Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD, which is constantly losing votes in the areas of urban population concentration, a study commissioned by the executive states that the party is presenting "the profile of a leftist liberal party primarily addressing the political minorities and one to be trusted as a party of the opposition rather than as a governing party."

As long as 6 years ago, Peter Glotz came to the conclusion that "the Social Democratic parties in the big centers of population are reacting to the pressure of problems of the present with a sharp turn toward the left or, as some say, toward the irrational." Hannover's Schmalstieg now finds that one must "not constantly talk about protection of the environment unless one insures jobs at the same time." But the SPD election strategist is also bothered by the fact that recently it has been the Greens and the Checkered who annihilated Social Democratic majorities.

The balancing act between the new party generation and the veteran comrades, the regular voters from among workers and employees, on the one hand, and alternatively disposed young citizens, on the other, now is also constituting a liability for such staunch leftists as Bremen Senator Franke. While there is sympathy in the party for squatters, he says, "street battles between masked figures and the police are something that frightens the citizen, of course."

According to him, "the conservatives have a much easier time there." He himself feels "this damned split personnally." On the one hand, he says he supports reforms in the colleges, but on the other hand he has to "call a halt" at his Bremen University "and occasionally slap some people's hands."

At the base the conflict then sometimes manifests itself the way it did recently in the Cologne-Dellbrueck party organization. There a young comrade came to the evening meeting and announced that henceforth he would only pay half of his membership fee to the party, and the other half to peace movements, for the SPD was a war party anyway. When an old comrade later talked about his son having been able to attend the gymnasium thanks to Social Democratic education policy, the gathering laughed at him.

"The arrogance of many college graduates and students" in the party is "intolerable," says a report by the Essen SPD discussing frictions among the city's Social Democrats

"A new beginning" is what Cologne SPD chief Rainer Maedge pleads for, for his part, "or else we will experience our own Munich." But the fact that the comrades in the south have not yet experienced everything by a long shot is indicated by the latest polls there. According to them, the SPD will no longer be able to retain the comparatively poor 37.7 percent it gathered last time but only 23 percent and perhaps just 17 percent.

Bremen's Franke is at a loss. Things "cannot be blamed entirely on the failure of chief mayors or simply on Bonn," he says. Perhaps it is just that "it present Social Democracy does not accord with the consciousness of a great number of people."

8790

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POLITICAL

PCI'S MILANI ON RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL CP, PT, PMDB

Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 4 Oct 81 p 9

[Text] "The battle to be fought in Brazil is the political battle, the battle of ideas," believes Communist Senator Armelino Milani, the Italian politician who has come to Brazil most often in the past 18 months. Born in Pavia 49 years ago, he was in our country on four different occasions during that time. Member of the Italian Communist Party [PCI] Political Secretariat, "Lino," as he insists on being called, is one of the principal collaborators of Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer, of whom he is a most faithful disciple.

This time Senator Armelino Milani came to Brazil to attend the first National. Convention of the Worker's Party [PT] held a week ago in Brasilia. The politician spoke to reporter Pedro Del Picchia during his short passage through Rio de Janeiro before embarking to fulfill some party commitments in Argentina, from where he will return to Italy where he is awaited by an important meeting of the PCI Central Committee which will begin in coming days.

In this interview, Senator Milani explains why his party maintains such good relations with the PT and denies there is a break between the PCI and the Brazilian Communist Party. He praises the serenity of Luis Inacio da Silva but warns of the danger of radicalization within the PT.

The Italian senator expressed optimism with respect to the process of Brazilian democratization and believes that the struggle by the opposition in Brazil at this time must be political, in the field of ideas. This, however, does not make him "discard in principle" other forms of struggle. "Hypothetically," he explains, "if another dictatorship such as that of Mussolini were to appear again we would not hesitate in taking up arms in defense of democracy."

FOLHA: How do you, who came to Brazil four times in the past 18 months, view the progress of the political situation in our country?

Milani: I think it is a situation which is truly progressing toward the reestablishment of a democratic system. We note that development through several signs: first, because there is a widespread political debate in Brazil today; second, because the government party and the military leaders of the government themselves declared and never denied that this is the process and that the move is toward general elections; third, because it is significant that for the first time since 1964 a civilian is replacing President Figueiredo during his illness. However, parallel to those positive developments of the democratic process, contradictory incidents are noted such as the imprisonment of unionists and peasants in the Northeast, the imprisonment of two French priests in Goias, the nonestablishment of full union freedoms, the fact that the majority of the unions still have appointed leaders and, primarily, the fact that the draconian National Security Law is in existence, which as long as it exists will not allow the establishment of a full democracy. However, despite all that, the democratic process advances.

FOLHA: What dangers could block that process?

Milani: The danger could be, for example, an external one if the international situation were to become worse and lead to a more severe confrontation between the two superpowers with the resulting initiation of new regional conflicts in the world. However, there is also an internal danger for the democratization process if a Brazilian political force or forces are in too much of a hurry in the battle for the establishment of a full democracy or for the achievement of reforms, thus provoking reactions by the military forces which still have great power. The entire armed forces wing which is "more open" would be placed in an embarrassing position if Brazilian political forces were to seek to move along certain paths under the illusion that a road could be shortened, which on the contrary will be long and difficult, for arriving not only at a full democracy but at the realization of a type of society which will finally be able to resolve the gigantic problems afflicting millions of Brazilians, particularly the most humble and disinherited people of this great country.

FOLHA: Do you believe the PT is running the risk of behaving like that hypothetical force which could try to move faster than history?

Milani: I believe there are some radical sentiments within that young party, the PT. However, that is natural. After all the PT is a party in formation and it has not traditions as yet, not even a tradition of errors or of successes and experience. That is why sometimes it is possible to commit the error of practicing a dangerous radicalism. I must say, however, that after attending the first national convention of that party I did not receive the impression that the leadership group advocates radicalized positions. On the contrary, the closing speech by Luis Inacio da Silva showed a serious, pondered and discreet position on the need to move, not by trampling reality, but step by step toward the establishment of democracy and the resolution of the great Brazilian problems.

FOLHA: Why does the Italian Communist Party maintain special relations with the PT?

Milani: We are Marxist party and the PT is not. This is the main difference of an ideological nature. The PT is a young party that has not yet adopted a specific ideology, which is even proper at this time.

FOLHA: Is the Brazilian Communist Party no longer a valid interlocutor for the PCI?

Milani: Unfortunately the PCB is still an illegal party and this is a serious void in this process of redemocratization in Brazil. I believe that if there is no legal recognition of the Communist Party, this democracy will always remain limited and incomplete. It is not true that the PCI and the PCB do not talk to each other. Relations with Brazilian Communists, despite the difficult conditions under which they have operated for many years, have always existed and we want them to continue. Many of the Brazilian Communist Party members have political and ideological positions on socialism in this country and the world similar to those sustained and proposed by the PCI. What happens is that the PCB is not the only one to whome the PCI talks in Brazil.

FOLHA: Does the PCI maintain some type of relationship with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party [PMDB]?

Milani: Truly the relations with the PMDB are minor. We had some very formal meetings with PMBD leaders, with the vice president, Teotonio Vilela, for example. But they were always very fortuitous, never organizational, contacts.

I believe the responsibility for that situation should not be attributed to the PCI. We want, and we would be honored, to maintain relations with that group also but we believe that it is up to the PMDB to seek those relations. At any rate, we believe the PMDB to be one of the basic forces of the process of redemocratization.

FOLHA: Why does the PCI, which has an obviously reformist program and policy, insist on calling itself a revolutionary party?

Milani: Because to want to change the present structure in a capitalist country such as Italy means being revolutionary. The revolutionary in 1981 cannot be considered in a restrictive sense as he who carries out the revolution. We believe that even though a peaceful revolution can also be the accomplishment of great structural reforms in our country which would involve the most important sectors of Italian life such as industry, agriculture, education and health. We believe that the resolution of these great problems from the point of view of benefit to the working and popular masses would become a revolutionary act. That is why we consider ourselves a great revolutionary party because the accomplishment of those gigantic reforms truly means the accomplishment of a revolution. And we are revolutionaries, primarily because we do not advocate a future which will maintain the exploitation of man by man. We advocate a government of the great majority, the popular masses, and against a government of elites.

FOLHA: The PCI was one of the first forces to take up arms against the fascist dictatorship. Today the Italian Communists are waging an exclusively political struggle. Do you absolutely discard the hypothesis of taking up arms once more?

Milani: No type of struggle can be discarded in terms of principles. If a regime such as that of Mussolini were to reappear in Italy—and I do not believe that is possible but I cite it as an example—it does not seem to me that there would be any other alternative but to take up arms. But against those who speak,

those who use written and oral propaganda, those who advocates ideas, we believe it is fair, necessary, even a duty, to oppose our own battle of ideas. We even believe that from our point of view the battle of ideas is democratic and revolutionary.

FOLHA: As far as you are concerned is the battle to be fought in the Brazil of today the battle of ideas?

Milani: Yes, because there is the real possibility today—I do not know about tomorrow but it exists today—for carrying forward the battle of ideas, acquiring more and more consensus and support. Against certain ideas of the great Brazilian capitalist bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the middle classes and the democrats who make up the group of parties which make up the opposition, must oppose their ideas, their programs and their activism so as to convince people to make choices which will strengthen the democratic battle, thus obtaining the great consensus needed for changing politics in this country.

8908

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PCI LEDDA'S REPORT ON PROBLEMS OF WORLD PEACE, DEVELOPMENT

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 6 Oct 81 p 7

[Report by Romano Ledda: "PCI Proposals for World Peace and Development: North-South, Disarmament Role of Europe"]

[Text] In submitting for discussion and for approval by the CC [Central Committee] a comprehensive proposal for instituting a solution to the pressing problem of underdevelopment—said comrade Romano Ledda, initiating his report—we shall address one of the decisive knots of the international crisis, the unraveling of which is the key to many aspects of the outlook for economic development and world peace.

It is our conviction indeed that the North-South problem has assumed a central relevancy in the political and economic problems that are upsetting the international order. One need only note the Middle East crisis and its interleaving with the energy problem to understand the vastness of the problems involved in the justifiable demand for a new international economic order.

We have mentioned peace and underdevelopment. But underdevelopment and its extinction are to be understood not as a just debt to be made good toward the starving people of the world but rather as a requisite condition to our own development. Hence, the proposal we shall submit involves a new and different view of world development; and it associates itself with the hard economic policy lines and choices the nation is currently being called upon to address. I believe—and this is one of the senses of this document—that Italy—an Italy that is moving farther and farther away from a certain international division of labor—can easily see that our proposal for a new relationship with the South, within the framework of a worldwide solution to the problem, goes directly to the heart of the problems of industrial reconversion, of planning and of a new type of development, on all of which our approach is based.

We are well aware and openly admit that this is not an easy undertaking. But based on the document we plan to submit and discuss with the social, political and ideological forces—not only the Italian ones—we think we can help further the sensitizing of the Italian and European workers movement through a decisive—struggle approach.

Our comrades will see our proposals, will question them, and will debate them. By way of this report I shall try to furnish some of the elements that comprise our proposals and bring them within the international context in which this report is submitted.

The international situation continues to be critical and strained, and the peace continues to be seriously threatened. It is the subject of much debate and it behooves us to clear the air of groundless polemics. We are not doomsayers who say: "We are on the verge of war."

Local Conflicts Multiplying

We say realistically and with carefully considered alarm that the chances of war are dangerously increasing. And not because the Americans or the Russians want war, but because international life has reached an overall historic crossroads in the relations among the states and among human beings that imparts to the current crisis a structural character.

I shall cite just four points that underscore the gravity of the situation.

First. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have never before reached a level as low as the current one, unless it was—though with different characteristics and in a different world context—during the harshest moments of the cold war. There is now an open contraposition. There are fear, suspicion and mutual distrus. There is even an incommunicability of language that frequently prevents the signals being sent from one of the powers to the other from being received and objectively evaluated. Today, the dialogue has recovered—and I shall return to this point—but the elements of controversy continue to predominate and to constitute a powerful factor of uncertainty in the world situation.

Second. Local conflicts are spreading and multiplying. The world has never heretofore in this postwar period known a tension as widespread as the current one or seen as many focal points of local wars flare up simultaneously. And with two characterizing innovations: Each conflict tends immediately to take on worldwide implications, to involve and contrapose the great powers to one another, to the point where even the internal crises of this or that country—I cite the most currently relevant: Iran and Poland—immediately become the cause of new world tensions. And the other innovation: The spread of the use of force, the emphasis on military means rather than on policy-level negotiations and diplomacy.

Third. There are the dimensional aspects of the economic crisis that is now having a disruptive impact on political relations among the states. One need only consider the issue of energy raw materials and the dangerous translation of that issue into a problem of military security rather than one of cooperation and mutually advantageous exchange. The entire Persian Gulf matter appears to me exemplary in this regard.

Fourth. Then there is the arms race, which is in large part a reflection and a consequence of the political uncertainty in which the world is living, but which itself in turn generates further uncertainty. A vicious circle has been established in which world tensions generate renewed rearmament, and renewed rearmament generates new world tensions.

These four points—although others could be added—are sufficient to expose the roots of the crisis in which detente finds itself and the contrapositive emergence of a trend toward its militarization, by considering an upward scaling of military power as a basis of and frequently a substitute for diplomacy. Truly, it is difficult to deny that there are threats to the peace. None of this has come about suddenly and spontaneously. The growing disorder, the instability and the ungovernability of international relations, the convulsive state that contradistinguishes the international situation of these last several years, are not the upshot of a sudden fit of madness among the states or of the human race, but are rather expressions of structural phenomena that have already been examined.

The resolutions adopted at the party's 15th Congress, followed by comrade Pajetta's report, then by the Central Committe's debate in 1979, and comrade Berlinguer's most recent speech in Torino have marked out analytically the path being taken by the changes in world realities, by its new problems and by the often stark alternatives, toward the imposition of a new system of international relations, a new world political order and a new economic order, as a solid basis for peace. Our comrades will find ample references in this regard in the rough draft on peace and development which they have received.

I shall therefore limit myself summarily here to a brief listing by headings of these processes that are helping us understand what is happening and why it is happening: A decline in the centrality of the big powers, not in terms of their weight or, above all, their military power, but rather in terms of their growing inability to manage, unassistedly, the governance of international relations. The disarticulation, in both East and West, and frequently the fragmentation of what until a few years ago could be defined as homogeneous and solidly united camps. The advent of new operators on the world scene: new nations, new nation states, small but also large ones -- China for example -- and medium ones endowed with new powers--one need only consider in this regard the oil producing countries. Nor could I overlook those commonly referred to as the new factors emerging under a religious profile--Islam, for example--and a social one: women and youth. And the latest in the form of political, ideological and social alignments specific, for example, to the Central American struggle for liberation. And lastly, the growing demand for democracy and participation, for emancipation and for justice, that is shaking up the international system.

In sum, there is a vast agitation that is imparting to the world forms that Togliatti would have called polycentric and that we today call multipolar. But the fact is that all of this continues to meet with opposition in the form of the deep-rooted rigidity of the hierarchies on which international relations have been built. This gap between "real world" and "legal world" produces crises and instability.

A purely ideological approach to this multiform reality and to the multiplicity of views it expresses serves little purpose. There is no white on the one hand hand and black on the other between which one may choose; there is a sum total that one must understand and shed light upon. I say this because there are always the strong pressures that come from one side or the other demanding that we draw up acritically, in battle order, and based on unequivocal judgements and Manichaean choices, a list of the factors in the crisis and the respective required responses.

Our reading of the world reality and of the growing nature of its complicacy is more laic, more materialistic. In the draft we are submitting we state the force with which imperialism opposes a real change in the present order. We also go, and indeed must go, into an open examination to update, to renovate, our understanding of imperialism and to define more completely its current manifestations. After all, 60 years and more of revolutionary and liberational struggle have not been for nought. But I believe that no analysis can properly exclude the materialistic factor, the class factor or that of an inequitable and unjust world order.

But here I would like to propose a question calling more for a political judgement, a judgement within the terms of reference of the international crisis, a judgement that could not be more complex.

Does not some of the responsibility for the present international crisis fall upon the USSR as well? This is a much debated question—in the party as well. The answer is positive and warrants some consideration, also because this evaluation is the subject of open debate in world public opinion, including that of socialist countries like China, involving viewpoints with which we do not agree.

It is well that we clear the field of the debate, of the clutter of a propaganda that is becoming obsessive. A major campaign is under way to show that the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States as a military power, upsetting world balances—I do not mean the European ones, which I shall take up later—in its own favor and thus becoming a menace to the world. Actually, the world strategic balances are well established and will probably remain so for some time. The new reality that has emerged over the years just past is actually that the USSR has attained militarity parity with the United States as regards its ability to intervene globally in every area of the world. This is what the United States is not willing to accept, "hindering the USSR from becoming a superpower, seeking to relegate the USSR to the role we certainly do not want to play: that of number two in the power scale." These were the words of Cyrus Vance when he resigned as Secretary of state during the Carter administration because of dissents that involved this analytical point as well.

Our Criticism of the USSR

Our criticism of the USSR is of another nature and has to do with its foreign policy of the past several years.

At the end of the Vietnam war, there was in the United States a wave of second thinking and a crisis, the emergence of a more cautious, less aggressive mentality averse to direct interventions, and the start of a reassessment of the scale of the American role in world affairs. In a confused, uncertain, contradictory way, this was the signal being flashed as the Carter administration came into power but was later extinguished, drowned in his oscillations and weaknesses that were unable to cope with the struggle which had opened up in the United States as well.

The question is whether the Soviet Union actually understood the significance of that moment in its relations with the United States. And more generally whether it recognized the broad openings for political initiative created by the dynamic

effects of the American defeat in Vietnam. I am thinking of two such openings above all: The value thus restored to nonalignment and the change that was taking place in North-South relations, opening up the possibility of a concrete start in the building of a new world order. And secondly, the possibility of launching a new drive toward detente that on the one hand would overcome the stalemate that was already evident in the detente process, which has now been reduced over the period of the last few years to the military sphere alone, and that on the other hand would overcome the inherent limitations that were already evident in an oversimplified conception of detente, seen only as a bilateral agreement.

And one might ask whether this lack of comprehension by the USSR did not give rise to the choice of a foreign policy that has gradually eroded confidence in political initiative—the last major initiative taken was that of the 1975 Helsinki Conference—in favor of the instrumentality of force, by seeking to gain new positions and to expand its sphere of influence; by frequently considering the ratio of military power and military alliances as substitutes for the self—sustaining processes of development and liberation. Whether it did not, in other words, result in the choice of the way of power politics, of consolidation and of expansion of its own politicomilitary bloc, as the more valid and more secure instrument of international initiative, thus making the USSR prisoner of a logic that has culminated in the Afghanistan intervention, which has contributed in no small part to the exacerbation of the international situation, to a subsequent crisis of detente, to serious problems for nonalignment, and to the erosion of those relationships between the socialist countries and the underdeveloped countries as a whole that had been one of the positive characteristics of this postwar period.

Reagan's Adventurism

Seen in a historical and political context, the USSR's reasons may have been many: old visions of encirclement, the severity of the break with China and fears of a policy aimed at isolating the Soviet Union, the open attempt to exclude the USSR from the Middle East crisis, the wearing down of the detente process that had set in during the 1970's in the United States. But this cannot be used as an escape hatch to elude judgement on our part of the responsibility the USSR bears in regard to the current crisis. It is with the same objectivity of judgement that we view today the Reagan administration's aggressive dynamism as one of most disturbing and dangerous factors in the international situation. This case also lends itself to the seeking of historical and political reasons. easy for the United States to accept and understand the rebellion of a periphery that no longer wants to be dependent on it, the loss of a world supremacy, the end of the myth of an American exceptionality. These are bitter pills that take a long time to swallow: Awareness of a new relationship between the United States and the world will come in complex forms. And certainly, account must be taken of how the United States -- and not only the United States -- may have perceived and interpreted the Soviet activism of the last several years. But the fact remains nevertheless that Reagan's response to these problems is adventurist and reactionary.

There is the unyieldingness of the confrontation with the USSR which I have cited above, consisting of continuous tests of strength, of a contrapositional tack that puts to question again the accords achieved during the 1970's.

There is an open and unmitigated attack on the world's South that is now taking shape on all terrains and in all spheres. Support of the dictators and of the most reactionary regimes of Africa, Asia and Latin America. A stepped-up deployment of military forces with growing demands being made upon the Allies to pick up a share of the burden. Outright refusal to negotiate at all on underdevelopment, defining the latter, as Reagan did at the IMF, as a "rhetorical division" between rich and poor. The characterization of every struggle for freedom as international terrorism and hence the transfer of every one of these struggles into the already bulging controversy between East and West. There is the bald attempt to bring the Europeans into line, to restore an undisputed American economic, political and military supremacy. Within this same framework, there isand it is not a secondary consideration -- the call to form new political and social lineups designed to carry the banner of monetarism and of freedom of the marketplace, thus eliminating not only any and all socialist trends but also the trend toward Keynesianism which is being called one of the great maladies of the last half-century. Then there is the arms race, as a corollary to power and bloc politics. And lastly, there is the disappearance--even as a term--of any further plan for detente. It is not by all means certain, of course, that this design will succeed. This is because of its inherent contradictions; because the United States no longer has the power to be at one and the same time the banker and the policeman of the world; because we are certain that a dynamic society such as is the American one has within itself farsighted forces capable of understanding the new and hence able to stand up against the tendencies being manifested by the Reagan administration.

But there is no time to wait. And if there is agreement on these analyses—and this is also subject to debate in this CC—the question is: What is to be done, what road is to be taken to ward off the dangers, and what forces are to be put into the field?

I fully understand the vastness of the span of the question. It may be said that something occurs every day on which a position and an initiative must be taken: from El Salvador to the Polish crisis, from South Africa to the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Southeast Asia; indeed, the span is extremely vast. And it is not my intent here to again go over the evaluations, judgements and clear positions we have already expressed authoritatively on all these questions.

What I wish to do is merely to focus attention on a few central, prioritary questions—if I may be permitted the use of this term—politically immediate questions on which work can begin in terms of movement, and on which there can be a debate in this CC to orient the party as to the content and the lines to be followed in renewing the struggle for peace.

There is an important point to be decided; it has to do with the agreement between the USSR and the United States. This also involves a debate. I do not believe we can occupy the position of one who complains because there is no agreement

between the superpowers only to turn around and complain again when that agreement is reached. I believe all the forces of democracy and of peace are interested in working toward attainment of that agreement and toward ensuring that it is a positive one. World tension would be substantially eased by it. What we are thinking—if the analysis we have developed so far is valid—is simply that an agreement between the two superpowers is no longer sufficient in itself to ensure the complete stability and peaceful governability of the world. It is an essential condition for the renewal of detente, but to be truly fruitful it must provide that detente with new bases—bases that are inseparable from a profound democratization and articulation of international relations and from a genuine start toward the solution of the world's most urgent structural problems: its political and economic ones.

Within these terms of reference, it appears to me that the problem of arms control must flank the North-South problem as appropriate terrain for political initiative.

I shall not waste time, comrades, in technical dissertations and in a controversial debate on what is to be considered military balance. The problems are first and foremost political. We have made our position very clear, unequivocal and not unilateral. In the current situation of international crisis, we consider it a basic condition that present balances be respected, and regard their alteration, by whichever side it has been made or shall be made, as further grounds for perturbment. This is the debate that is now going on regarding the European Theater. We have therefore held since the beginning and continue holding as of now that there must be a negotiation that takes into account all the perceptions and concerns of the interlocutors, that restores the balances wherever they have been altered, and that genuinely addresses a reduction in the levels the balances had attained. Clearly, then, the negotiation must involve all Euromissiles: SS20 Pershing, Cruise.

Two Determinative Problems

The negotiation between the United States and the USSR has now gotten off to a timorous start and we are glad of it, especially when we think of the 2 years that have been lost. But two determinative problems are pressing. The first has to do with the timetable of the negotiation. A resolution passed by Socialist International on the 25th of last month fixes a precise time limit within which the result of the negotiation can be considered positive: not later than 1983, so as to avoid the installation of the missiles in Western Europe. Well, we believe the negotiation could proceed, I would say, even more rapidly, if the political desire is there. I would like to cite an authoritative voice being heard these days coming from the FRG, commenting on the negotiation: "The most important thing is that the political aspect of the question take over the negotiation before the experts have a chance to take positions that are not politically acceptable." And this brings us to the second problem: What is Europe doing? Is it awaiting the outcome of the negotiation? Is it delegating the matter to the United States and the USSR? Is it limiting itself to, in the best of cases, exerting pressures? Or should it--and we must fight for this to be done--demand that it participate directly in the negotiation, with the right to submit independently its own agenda of issues to be negotiated?

We have held a debate recently in the Chamber which all our comrades have followed closely and I shall not therefore repeat here the criticisms we expressed through the interventions of comrades Pajetta and Rubbi with regard to the performance of the Italian government, the contradictions that have sprung up among the political forces and within the forces themselves, and hence as to our own unitary initiative in this respect. Permit me solely to point out that it is futile for us to agree in words on objectives, timing and European participation in the negotiation if we then proceed in the manner of Comiso, which deprives us of all contractual power and limits Europe's effective negotiating autonomy.

The problem of timing and of Europe's presence has become in recent months the basis of an initiative that must be pressed, continued and made an initiative of the masses.

In August, we had in Italy the development of an important movement that is now reaching the level of the movement for peace that has developed in Europe over the past 1 and 1/2 years. Our comrades will of course tell us this. I think it can be affirmed as of now, however, that this is not a minority movement or one of protest. In Europe, it has already brought about governmental positions, such as those of the Belgian and Dutch governments. In Italy, it has rallied broadly-based and real forces; one need cite only the Catholic world. Its driving force has already taken on an articulated and at the same time unitary character, and it has already provoked a broad ideopolitical debate that has shaken the political and social forces and has therefore had a political impact. Is it yet, however, a movement of the size and suitability demanded by the graveness of the problems? Is there not much yet to be done? We must evaluate these aspects as well in this CC, to see what further contribution we can make to its development.

There is a basic problem to be examined: The general question being put, not in the abstract but in the concrete, is whether the threatened use of nuclear weapons must be accepted as a permanent fact with which we must learn to live. This question—the atomic factor—had been put to rest in years past, for reasons we have stated many times over. Now, not by mere chance, it is surfacing again in the public awareness.

A Fateful Threshold

Indeed, we are at a fateful threshold. And not only because of a fearful waste of resources in a world situation that demands them for more sensible uses, but also for qualitative reasons. Unless a renewed arms race—that is, the production and development of a new technological generation of nuclear weapons, many of which are now ready and others of which are under study—the world will be subjected to new structurally and inherently destabilizing processes. In place of security there will be a generalized insecurity. In place of a balance of terror, already very fragile, we will have an imbalance of terror. The world and the superpowers had laboriously achieved in past years an agreement and a code based on the monitoring of weapons, their controllability, their dissuasive nature—the famous concept of deterrence. Today, all of that is in danger of being, and in part has already been, blown to bits. The demarcation between conventional and

nuclear weapons is rapidly vanishing, as is that between tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons. There is now talk of limited nuclear wars, symbolized by the N-weapon, and of learning to live with the fact that sooner or later, perhaps with the advent of further technological improvements, one of the powers may be tempted to feel that it can inflict a decisive strike upon the other without having to suffer a reprisal. Let us add to this the horizontal nuclear proliferation that is taking place, with dozens of nations in possession of, or in line as candidates to possess, atomic weapons; let us also add the alarming and terrifying advent of the new chemical weapons. This will give us a better understanding of the dark and dangerous tunnel mankind will be entering with the start of a new arms race.

We must stop it before it is too late. And it can be done--and this is the dramatic innovation--if we can overthrow the logic that has heretofore governed the entire question of arms and security.

This is the reason, and above all the reason, why we consider unacceptable the proposition of an independent European nuclear rearming that would not only mean a greater allocation of resources, which on top of it all are lacking, to military expenditures, but would also signify Europe's resigned acceptance of the logic that must be destroyed, thus further jeopardizing the chances of detente in Europe itself.

It is terrifying to hear the number of voices—a great many of them representing world authorities, but also those repeating the same thing ad infinitum in the halls of our Parliament—accrediting the old Roman saying: "If you want peace, prepare for war"; if you want security, arm further; if you want to negotiate, you must do so from strength; almost saying that negotiation itself has no part in the security of relations among nations.

I do not know but what that saying may have been valid in the past, but certain it is that it is insensate in our nuclear era, because it exacerbates mutual distrusts, spreads uncertainty, and increases warlike temptations beyond the volitional constraints of everyone, because, objectively speaking—and this is the other major innovational aspect—military technology development increasingly eludes political control. This is another reason for the extreme importance of the birth of a movement, as widespread in Europe as it is in Italy, that wants to take back into its hands the issue of peace and war, that says that private citizens also have the right to know and the duty to intervene.

It can astonish no one that the magnitude of these problems has resulted in an explosion of radically rejective positions, proposals for unilateral disarmament, opinions of the most diverse natures, which may or may not be shared, and many of which we ourselves do not share, but which express the full awareness and—and why not?—the fear of what is now occurring. This confronts us with a serious problem that I would like to state in these terms: Our ability to effectively coalesce the realism of the immediate proposals we are making with the more general objective of a ban on tactical and strategic atomic weapons and of a gradual, balanced and controlled reduction of conventional weapons that will bring their levels down to strictly defensive proportions, bearing in mind that none of us is so naive as to believe that problems of defense and security will no longer exist.

New Ideas on Cooperation

Within the framework of this concept it will then be possible to study the time-tables and set up the immediate, intermediate and long-term objectives—the tests of good faith, denuclearized areas, resumption of SALT 2 negotiations, etc—that cannot be planned in the abstract but that are inherent parts of the real movement it will be possible to generate. The point to be established is whether or not we are in agreement with this overall view interleaved as it is with new conceptions of security and new ideas on international cooperation. And whether a movement for peace during the 1980's should not have as its own this vast horizon in order not to exhaust itself in fortuitous protest and to avoid the dangers of illusory flights into the future.

This, after all, appears to me to be the sense of the "peace culture" about which so much is being said.

We can already anticipate some objections and accusations of abandonment of the choice that has already been made with respect to Italy's current alliances. We reiterate clearly that it is not our intent to undertake any action whatever unilaterally, either as regards disarmament or as regards our remaining in the Atlantic Pact. We maintain that the existing politicomilitary blocs are, within the precariousness of the present international situation, still a delicate instrument of stability, in the East as well as the West. And that unilateral actions disruptive of these balances -- the entry of Spain into NATO, for example, would be one--contain more dangers than advantages. Thus, we are not being bound by any neutralizational intent. But by the same token, we must ask ourselves and debate whether it is reasonable to maintain that the blocs must continue to exist forever and that any view of a different future extending beyond the limits of these blocs must be considered a danger. We must ask ourselves and debate whether, though still remaining within one of the blocs, we must not oppose the rationale itself of blocs, particularly when-as is the case in the current situation-that rationale is a duality: Internally, a stern discipline that subordinates the weaker allies; externally, a frontal contraposition of one bloc against the other.

There is in fact a problem that is developing in the West as well as the East--in the West, with the setting in of complications and controversy in inter-Atlantic relations; in the East, with the Polish crisis -- that cannot be eluded: that of refitting the blocs to the reality of their internal articulations, that of the legitimacy of internal dissent with respect to political and military options, in sum, that which could be called a laicization of the blocs. This holds true for the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO. I will cite just two examples with regard to the latter: It is not sufficient in this sense not to retreat from our position that NATO's character must be defensive. We must also repulse all pressures to extend the initiatives of blocs that are European -- in our case, NATO-beyond established historic boundaries. What security would there be for Europe were NATO to become involved in the Middle East crisis? And from a more general standpoint, What would be the resulting relationship between Europe and the world's South? In reality, only the recognition, on our part, of politicomilitary blocs as a fortuitous circumstance of world history, and the recognition, on their part, of an effective internal articulation within themselves, of their own geographical limits and of their defensive character can be the basis of an alliance among equals.

In dealing with the seriousness of the current international crisis and with the alternatives arising from it, Western Europe is called upon to assume specific and independent responsibilities. It is not so much, and for that matter not solely, a matter of defending egoistically the positive results that detente has produced on the European terrain, which, however, be it understood, cannot be expected to last if world tension is exacerbated or prolonged. The stakes, rather, are substantially higher. What are at stake are Europe's margins of independence and of security itself, which would be drastically reduced, if not altogether compromised, were the rearmament race and the contraposition of East and West to prevail. And without a new cooperative relationship with the world's South, hence without the beginning of a solution of the problem of underdevelopment, we can hardly expect to find a solution to the gaps and forms of decline--suffice it to cite the steel industry as a whole, the basic chemicals industry, the textile manufacturing industry--that the new international division of labor and the other areas of capitalistic competition are introducing into the European productive apparatus. The overturning of current international trends is therefore in Europe's general interest, that of all its countries -- an interest that coincides with the objective of a democratic and peaceful evolution of international political and economic relations.

There are stirrings in some governments, in the political forces, in public opinion, of an incipient awareness of the positive function Europe could fulfill as an active co-promoter and actuator in the steering of a new international course.

It can nevertheless not be denied that this awareness is still very tenuous, uncertain, and that when confronted by decisive moments—the most recent meeting of the IMF, for example—Europe divides and yields.

In effect, Europe is more a potentiality than a reality. The European Community is foundering in crisis. Unable to go beyond the framework of a customs union based on free trade, even the limited forms of integration it has managed to achieve heretofore are being eroded by a ground swell of protectionism, an upsurge of nationalism, each country for itself in loose order. National policies have the upper hand, and this is not without consequences on the economic and political terrains, as much for our most powerful ally as for our East European interlocutors as for the world's South. To put it in the simplest of terms, what is lacking is a permanent and united European interlocutor with whom to address, negotiate, and give life to a new policy.

We cannot close our eyes to this fact. It is not to weaken but rather to strengthen the European choice that we must rivet together, as a fundamental political objective of our initiative, knowing that it is a political objective to be put together piece by piece, to be won by way of planning and of arrays of force, in the heat of a fierce struggle on a European scale between the forces of progress and the forces of conservatism—a struggle that day after day makes itself felt, with the outcome still very much an open prospect, as is evident from the important victory of Mitterrand and the Left in France.

Our struggle must be developed, and not only in the European Parliament but also in our National Parliament and throughout the country, into a cohesive, constant and concrete force acting upon the coordination of the foreign policies of nations within a stable framework of European foreign policy, each respectful of its alliances but autonomous with regard to its orientations and choices. One might ask, for example, not only what the value would be today, in immediate terms, of a decided action by Europe in regard to a global North-South negotiation, a unitary intervention of its own in the problem of armaments, but also an opendialogue initiative of its own with all those forces in movement outside the blocs, and especially the the movement of nonaligned nations, to make space again in the international political spectrum for a dialectic that will avoid the risk of being seduced again by the logics of power and bloc politics.

The Objectives of the Left

There must be an intensification of our political and movemental initiatives toward a coordinated European strategy in the industrial, hence the commercial, spheres, at least in those sectors in which the place occupied by the nation is insufficient; I have in mind energy, telecommunications and informatics, avionics, bioengineering, in sum, all the high-technology industrial sectors. Without this economic hinterland, there is no way the European currencies can survive in the absence of solutions to the problems that have been discussed herein.

The responsibilities and the tasks of the European Left in this regard are vast. It behooves us also to not ideologize the situation and to recognize that the Left has not made of Europe the terrain of a unitary initiative of its own. The divisions, the diversities of positions, do not demarcate communists on one side and socialists and social democrats on the other; on the contrary, they cross over into all components of the workers movement and even penetrate individual parties. Here also there is therefore an objective to be attained, a force to be built up. But it is not a matter of starting from scratch. And if we maintain and convey the awareness that the European choice is not one of many but the only and necessary one, if we work on the basis of concrete platforms, on the basis of programs and not ideologies, if we base our work on an objective analysis of the crisis and its causes, overturning all old schemes and all of them together, then Europe's Left can truly be the political leader of a renovated, more united Europe that with its economic, technological and cultural resources can become an active agent in a new political lineup and a new world economic order.

The North-South, disarmament, the role of Europe: These are the three terrains—and interactive terrains they are, for that matter—on which which we propose to work, with the prudence of realism, but also with the force of new ideas equal to the problems of the 1980's.

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POLITICAL

SOCIALIST INTERIOR MINISTER VAN THIJN ASSESSED

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[Article by Rene De Bok: "Study of the Weight of the New Ministerial Team: Ed Van Thijn X-Rayed"]

[Text] The Van Agt II cabinet includes seven first-timers: Van Dam, Van Der Louw and Van Thijn of the PvdA [Labor Party], Van Mierlo, Terlouw and Zeevalking of D'66 [Democrats of 1966], and Van Dijk of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal]. ELSEVIER begins a consumer study this week of the quality and weight of the new leadership. Determining factors for the final score are: 1. qualifications and experience, 2. character traits, 3. image, 4. authority within the present coalition, 5. position within his own party, and 6. pattern of expectations of the outside world. Each area is accorded the same weight, measured on a scale of 1 to 100. The PvdA Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr Ed Van Thijn, is first.

Qualifications and Experience

From the beginning, Dr Ed Van Thijn has been recognized as one of the most brilliant representatives of the post-war generation of socialists. He is undoubtedly the most zealous student of the Den Uyl school. And yet, he can be categorized as one who received the call late. He has no history in a socialist youth movement like the AJC [Labor League of Youth] nor even in the FJC (Federation of Youth Groups), in which Hans Kombrink climbed up to the lower peaks of the PvdA. Not until he was 25 years old did Van Thijn join the PvdA. After 2 years he became a member of the staff of the scientific office of the PvdA under director Den Uyl, the Wiardi Beckman Foundation. His background: the HBS-B [secondary school] department of the Amsterdam Lyceum and a study of political science in Section A of the Municipal University. By way of the Wiardi Beckman Foundation he quickly became involved in a number of political activities. Den Uyl was always his great model.

Because of his background, Van Thijn's voice came to be taken seriously. He suggested election strategies, was employed in campaigns and analyzed election studies. For 20 years, Van Thijn has been a member of every body in the PvdA which has been engaged in thinking out election campaigns.

Van Thijn is the man who thought up the magic word "Turning Point '72." He wrote the introduction, "Turning Point for a New Policy, a New Order, a New Democracy." In '77, he was the brain behind the "Forwards" program, this year he thought up the slogan "Back to Work."

Van Thijn has sampled every nook and cranny on the political battleground. In '62 he became a member of the Amsterdam municipal council, once again in Den Uyl's footsteps, then alderman. After '65 Van Thijn was the Labor Party delegation chairman. The wooly years of the '60's made great demands on the PvdA's political balance, and particularly on Van Thijn. But that was not his only job: in the party bureau he was directly involved in the disturbances of the Cals/Vondeling cabinet. As the then-standard-bearer Vondeling's right hand, Van Thijn recorded the minutes of the socialist ministers' confidential meetings. At the same time, he was the organizational focus of the contacts between the ministers, the PvdA's executive council, and the leadership of the delegation.

After the council elections of '66, Van Thijn also opted for the Second Chamber. In '67, he became Den Uyl's campaign director, which gave him the title: "The Man Behind Den Uyl," a characterization he came to detest more and more over the years.

He has never denied his politico-logical background. He published like a fanatic and was one of the compilers of the report: "The Vote That Counts," about the desirability of constitutional reform. In the '60's that resulted in a legislative proposal by the PvdA, D'66 and PPR [Political Party of the Radicals] for the prime minister-elect, which, for that matter, disappeared into a deep valley. During the Den Uyl cabinet and the '77 cabinet formation, Van Thijn was the PvdA delegation chairman in the Second Chamber. After the formation of the Van Agt I cabinet, the negotiator Van Thijn lost a bit of ground, but he never fell by the political wayside. The political significance of the author of "Diary of a Negotiator" is too great for that. In the '71 shadow cabinet, Van Thijn was minister of transportation and waterworks; now, 10 years later he has penetrated to Internal Affairs.

Score: Qualifications and Experience: 83

Character Traits

"I am just a bit precise." That is how Ed Van Thijn has described himself more than once. There is no arguing with that. Van Thijn answers every appeal; he goes to work conscientiously, strives for completeness and shading; he seldom arrives anywhere late. He is a sharp annotator of political events. He is overzealous at that and always filled with the idea of joining in. That stimulates him to extra efforts and to alertness to pitfalls. Two deeply felt experiences form the foundation of his political career: his traumatic wartime experiences and a short but violent period in France from which he derived his stimulus to political involvement as a follower of Mendes-France. His wartime experiences—twice imprisoned at Westerbork, 18 undercover addresses—infected him with a permanent fear of the decline of democracy, with the fear "that by squandering out democratic order we could get less democratic systems in its place." This trauma caused him to begin studying political science, it also brings him to the forum of national politics,

the Second Chamber. He succeeds in avoiding the evils of fanaticism and political blindness through two characteristics. Van Thijn is loyal, but he insists on an independent decision. On the other hand, he believes in the socialist case, but he is also able to balance the weight of his convictions. That is what gives him his great credibility. He even says, "I believe in independence, within the party choice." And along with that, "Expressing an independent opinion just to be noticed does not appeal to me. Political exhibitionism does not appeal to me."

Van Thijn is a person who has few personal enemies; he is esteemed—again, by both friend and foe—for his devotion, his integrity and not least for his loyalty. He is therefore suited to work in a team situation, as long as the mutual solidarity is not based on fiction but on reality. If Van Agt succeeds in cementing the gaps in his team, then Van Thijn's loyalty to the Van Agt II cabinet will be beyond doubt; if it remains a grumbling, happenstance combination, then Van Thijn's loyalty to his own party following, party leadership and party council may very well become more important. His loyalty to the interest groups with which he will meet as minister of internal affairs is beyond question. As early as 1969, when he was worrying over the City of Amsterdam's financial deficits, he let slip something of his view of the job of a minister of the interior. Speaking of the minister of that time, Beernink, he said, "As minister of internal affairs, his job is to watch over the weal and woe of the municipalities. He ought to fight for the municipalities. But he is weak; he is a donothing who avoids the problems."

One facet of Van Thijn's character cannot go without mention, and that is his unstoppable urge to make himself felt. His entrance into the ministerial palace is the absolute highpoint of his political career to him, for which he has been waiting for years. That urge to make himself felt can be kept in check, as Van Thijn has shown, so long as the frustrations in his work do not become unbearable. Thus this remains an uncertain factor in the Van Agt II cabinet.

Socre: Character Traits: 77

Image

When Ed Van Thijn became the [PvdA] delegation chairman in the Second Chamber, DE TELEGRAAF wrote: "Van Thijn, who is rather timid and amiable by nature, succeeds the ambitious and somewhat gruff Dr Den Uyl." Within the year, DE TELEGRAAF corrected the picture. Van Thijn was no longer "timid and amiable," but "arrogant and presumptious." The reality is complicated. In private, Van Thijn sometimes comes over as rather timorous; he does not push his political viewpoints. In his public behavior a completely different Van Thijn surfaces. Van Thijn possesses a definite ability to sell his ideas. In 1966, when the PvdA lost 2 percent nationally, in Amsterdam the PvdA scored a .5 percent gain. That could be attributed to a personally directed campaign, in which Van Thijn went out into the street with a microphone, plowing through all of Amsterdam hunting for potential PvdA voters. His campaign was supported by advertisements in the papers, in which Van Thijn himself was represented as a man of the people.

There are two sides to Van Thijn's image. He shows up better in front of a politically motivated audience than in front of a crowd which is barely interested in politics. In political debate, he is quick, alert, sharp and able to express a

complicated matter clearly in words. Still, he appeals more to intellectuals, semi-intellectuals and those who rank themselves in one of those two groups, than to the masses of the labor movement. His academic background continues to be determinant in favor of an analytical manner of reasoning.

He is afraid of the popularization of the position of minister. He considers eating pea soup in the popular diners or kicking off the first ball to be a waste of time. Therefore the defense of his policies in the Second Chamber will be easier for him than presenting himself to the public. In the March, 1976, SOCIALISME EN DEMOCRATIE, he wrote: "The number of hours ministers spend in crisis centers dealing with the nth hostage situation, boycott action or civil disturbances increases constantly. (. . .) While the major lines which determine our future are drawn up in the big economic power centers, the ministers, members of parliament and civil servants run themselves ragged chasing incidents." Thus that is not Ed Van Thijn's style of presentation.

Even though there is no doubt of his debating skill, it does have a beauty mark. As long as Van Thijn has the opportunity to find words for his viewpoints in peace and quiet, "Den Uyl's shield-bearer" is the image of patience and stability. But as soon as he meets stiff opposition, there is a hidden risk factor in his outward behavior. He is then inclined to dispense with his amiability in favor of somewhat aggressive opposition, which rather quickly comes over as arrogance. His tone becomes fiercer, he becomes somewhat convulsive in his posture and defense. The medium of television, in particular, shows this metamorphosis precisely. In this area, Van Thijn could learn a lesson from the present prime minister, who almost never falls out of character. If Van Thijn succeeds in restraining his irritability, his sensitivity to criticism, his image will become one of his stronger points.

Score: Image: 64

Authority within the Present Coalition

In the CDA/PvdA/D'66 coalition, Van Thijn is one of the few socialists with very little inherited debt in the area of dogmatism. Along with Van Der Stoel, Van Kemenade, Van Dam and Van Der Louw are former members of the New Left. Even Den Uyl has often been forced to raise party politics to first priority because of the zealous activities of his rank-and-file. Van Thijn is less burdened by that. If ever he gets the freedom of action, he will find it easy to make the position of statesman his own. That characteristic accords him the goodwill of Van Agt in the coalition, and of Terlouw as well. In the last cabinet formation, Van Agt considered Van Thijn to be too big to become the minister of internal affairs. In his "Diary of a Negotiator," Van Thijn writes that Van Agt was not at all interested in becoming minister of internal affairs himself. "What do they ever do there, anyway?" he asked. I protested, "Quite a lot," and began my summation, which I had made so often in my thoughts. "Do you know," I said, "if we get internal affairs, I am the candidate for that."

"Do not do it, Ed," said Dries. "In all friendship, you are too big for that job."

Even though within the PvdA Van Thijn has always been the inventor of the polarization ideas, in order to make the contrasts in Dutch politics visible to the

voter, Van Thijn is not the man to ride party-political hobby horses at all costs. In 1967 he spoke out once about the conditions a demonstration ought to meet in his opinion. Those were: not blocking traffic, no injury to people, no damage to goods, no thoughts that are in conflict with socially accepted rights and freedoms. As far as Van Thijn was concerned, "Johnson Murderer" could not pass muster for official toleration. One of the Kritiese University's writings called Van Thijn a product of a "critical convent school."

He can build up his authority in this coalition through the nuances which he weaves into his positions. Van Thijn often expounds upon the economic power differentials within the current system of production, about power concentration in the development of technology, which affect human freedom. But he is not over-insistant, the collective provisions [system of social security benefits, etc.] are not holy; he is not anti-business, not anti-profit. Van Thijn is more inclined to stand above the parties. Because of that he would be a fitting mayor of Amsterdam, presumably better than Wim Polak, who was named to that position.

In the coalition he can be the adhesive between the more dogmatically oriented socialists and the fearful Christian Democrats. As middleman, as negotiator he has a certain amount of say with each party involved. And it is doubtful whether Den Uyl can fulfill this function better than Van Thijn. Until a few years ago, Van Thijn's freedom of movement was still limited by his relationship with Den Uyl. Van Thijn continued to be Den Uyl's disciple. Since then there has been every indication that this role no longer suits him. As the PvdA delegation chairman in the Second Chamber he already showed signs of that: "We are not Den Uyls' errand boys."

It is perceived within the PvdA that Van Thijn's reasonability is not without hazard for the socialist contribution to the Van Agt II cabinet, especially because opposition leader Wiegel has designated Van Thijn as the star of the cabinet in advance. That was done with the idea that if they praised Van Thijn, the unity of the socialist bloc would be broken. If Van Thijn could be maneuvered into that position, the possibility could not be excluded that he would be isolated.

Score: Authority Within the Present Coalition: 74

Position Within His Own Party

Characteristic of Van Thijn is the strength of his position in the political establishment: the party summit and the [Chamber] delegation. But elsewhere his position is undermined. In the party leadership and the party council there are socialists who view Van Thijn's reasonable socialism askance. Van Thijn continues to be accused of not having involved himself enough in the 1960's in the renovation process within the PvdA. It is said of him that even then he stood above the party. Van Thijn has never countered that; he has even admitted it himself in so many words. He lost his turn in the game of "Put It All on the Red" because he wanted to be loyal to his job as the chairman of the [PvdA] delegation in the Amsterdam council. Van Thijn felt that the New Left's challenge to the party was not compatible with that. "It would be nard for me to challenge myself." And even though joining the New Left in those days was a guarantee of a speedy career in the party, Van Thijn held himself aloof. Too aloof, many thought. Van Thijn has since

added a few arguments to his motivation: he also had his reservations about the New Left on account of the personal attacks on Den Uyl, the secret agreements and the denunciations of nonmembers of the New Left. Nonetheless, his position today is marked by the line of demarkation which was drawn in the 1960's. For many who attend the PvdA party congress Van Thijn is a representative of the Hague circuit, not a man of the barricades, not a man who forces concessions from the political opponent through inflexible negotiation.

The result of the negotiations Van Thijn came up with after a long tug-of-war was voted down by the party council. Van Thijn saw that in part as a personal letdown. He found out that the rank-and-file is more impressed by rigidity on principle than by a talent for concluding compromises, is more taken with slogans than with a treatise on the renovation of the democratic system. That rank-and-file has never been particularly impressed by Van Thijn's written visions. And it has been heard several times from the rank-and-file that Van Thijn would just have to join the D'66 if he is so eager to see the district system and the direct election of the prime minister be instituted. And because of that, one of the most brilliant socialists of the post-war generation has never been appreciated in his own circles. When Den Uyl became prime minister in 1973, voices were heard from among the rank-and-file not to designate Ed Van Thij but Jan Pronk as the PvdA delegation chairman in the Second Chamber. Because the goodwill Van Thijn enjoyed in the party summit and near summit, he was spared this letdown. His reasonably stable position of today is therefore based almost entirely on the support of the party leadership of the PydA. The fact that Van Dam, Van Der Louw and the secretaries of state Stemerdink and Kombrink also support his position gives Van Thijn the assurance that he is not teetering on a seesaw. However, should Van Thijn deviate a bit too noticeably from the PvdA route of march, then there will be problems once again in the rank-and-file concerning Van Thijn's socialist behavior.

Score: Position Within His Own Party: 65

Pattern of Expectations in the Outside World

The reactions of the outside world to Van Thijn's conduct as minister of internal affairs are determined by three factors: the emphases he sets in his policies, the tactics of which he makes use, and the goodwill upon which he can count.

The emphases Van Thijn places will generally be defensive in nature. Van Thijn does not particularly want to become involved in the polarization between the municipalities and the national government personnel. Van Thijn will deal primarily with matters which are generally not subject to much opposition. Thus the number of jobs in government for which a security clearance is required will be reduced. Control of the intelligence services will be expanded. Police training and procedures will be altered in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. Van Thijn will hazard an attempt to support the big municipalities in their attempts to create order out of financial chaos. In his tactics with respect to the noisy rank-and-file of the civil servants' unions, Van Thijn will show an indulgent side. He had scarcely paid his respects to Queen Beatrix before he sat down with the chairmen of the five civil servants's federations for the first informal talk. "The meaty question," said Chairman Lammert Post of the Christian civil servants' federation CFO [Christian Federation of Government Personnel in the Netherlands], "is what

Van Thijn is going to do with the proposals which the previous cabinet made in the budget." And he added, "At any rate, his first statements were encouraging."

Post inferred from that that the threatened reduction in civil servants' pensions was postponed for the time being. "As early as 1978, Van Thijn pointed out the danger of a polarization between the civil servants and the rest of the Netherlands, employed or not." In the past years, Van Thijn has repeatedly opposed the civil servants policy.

After the 1981 Millions Bill had appeared, Van Thijn promptly reacted: "Once again the Millions Bill makes short shrift of the trend [wage and price compensation] policy. The trend policy was intended to guarantee an evenhanded treatment of the employees of both government and business. Certainly it would be a sad thing if the government as an employer were to push off its financial problems one-sidedly on its own employees. Unfortunately the Van Agt/Wiegel cabinet does not shrink from that."

It is clear that a civil-servant ideologue like Dutman can correspond better with Van Thijn than with Wiegel. The goodwill Van Thijn enjoys is connected with the communications difficulties between Wiegel and the civil servants' [union] leaders. In 1978 Van Thijn criticized Weigel and considered the strikes to be permissable. But that goodwill can change quickly when Van Thijn, too, sees that the bottom of the treasury coffers is coming in sight.

A somewhat different situation arises in the relations between the minister and the police personnel. Leen Van Der Linden's Police Union is moderately positively inclined towards the new minister. But it is very much in doubt whether that will ever get off the ground. As yet the personnel are still a little unaccustomed to the sight of the first socialist minister in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. If problems arise right away in the maintenance of public order, the minister's path looks as though it leads through a minefield.

Score: Pattern of Expectations of the Outside World: 62

The average score of Minister of Internal Affairs Dr Ed Van Thijn, rounded upwards, is 71. From that we can draw the conclusion that Van Thijn will not wind up in the danger zone very quickly.

6940

CSO: 3105/8

POLITICAL SPAIN

BASQUE COMMUNIST MERGER DETAILED, ANALYZED

Madrid LA CALLE in Spanish 22-28 Sep 81 pp 12-16

[Article by Alberto Elordi]

[Text] On 13 September the Central Committee of the Basque Communist Party made public a letter to the EIA(Basque Revolutionary Party), suggesting that the two parties begin negotiations to create a new party based on a merger of the two organizations. The "Biltzar Tippia" (chief governing organ of the EIA) replied to the Communists with a laconic note in which it accepted the PCE-EPK [Spanish Communist Party-Basque Communist Party] proposal to postpone the Euskadiko Ezkerra [Basque Left] [EE] Constituent Congress, at the same time congratulating itself on the latest suggestions of the Basque Communist Party with respect to the national situation and other questions.

Reaction to this exchange of communications has been diverse. The Communists, who have had difficulty maintaining an internal balance since their Fourth and last Congress gave rise to two factions, are divided. On the one hand are those who obtained the majority in the Congress and as a result have taken a direction in keeping with their political line. On the other are the minorities in the Congress, who nevertheless have solid positions of power on the Basque Workers Commissions. Among the first—who are more sensitive to the national question, favor a greater autonomy with respect to the Spanish Communist Party and, finally, lean toward a merger with the Easque Left—are the secretary general of the party, Roberto Lertxundi, and the majority of the upper and intermediate cadres of the party. Among the second—closer to the party tradition favoring the maintenance and strengthening of ties with the PCE and hostile to the plan to merge with the EIA—are Tomas Tueros, secretary general of the CC. OO.

[Workers Commissions]; former party chairman Ramon Ormazabal and a good many of the veteran workers leaders.

There have been no negative reactions in EIA to the unity project. The plan is being discussed in assemblies open to party members and sympathizers and, by all indications, it is being received sympathetically. The public statement of support for the plan by Jose Ignacio Mugica Arregui, an outstanding former

member of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], who in the last EIA assembly spearheaded the most nationalistic positions, has been important to this plan. The rest of the Basque political forces have responded with silence to the plan for the EIA-EPK merger. Through the enigmatic silence of the Herri Batasuna [HB] [Popular Unity] one can sense a certain unrest, since the possibility of the formation of a new leftist party in the Basque Country might cause it to lose important electoral support. The Basque Nationalist Party, which appears to have considered the unity plan a natural development, might also fear more serious competition from the Left. Nor have the Socialists made any statement about the plan. In any case, today's silence appears to herald tomorrow's noise. No doubts that if the party is created without any further shocks, nationalist campaigns against it will worsen, particularly in view of its Marxist character.

Still In the Air

When the Fourth PCE-EPK Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution proposing a rapprochement with Basque Left which would result in an organic merger, there were few, both within and outside the party, who took it literally. At first reading, the decision of the Basque Communists was interpreted as a sort of enunciation of good intentions, a statement of principles or simply a maneuver aimed at transforming the image of the PCE-EPK. However, the minority faction tried on that occasion to obstruct the agreement and finally succeeded in introducting a corrected version which referred to unity agreements with the Basque Socialists, in addition to those with the EIA. In this way the minority faction tried to dilute the solidity of the positions taken by the majority, toning down the unity policy in a broader connotation, in spite of the fact that "any unity agreement with the PSE (PSOE) [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] was, a priori, very risky and even unworkable.

Those who did indeed take the resolution very seriously were the members of the majority faction and, particularly, the new leadership that came out of the Fourth Congress. The timid contacts established by the rank-and-file organizations of the EIA and PCE-EPK continued to multiply throughout last spring, resulting finally in official meetings which reached their apogee after the vacation period. At one of these meetings, then, as we have said, the decision was made to invite EIA to join a unity process, and it was finally made public in documents mutually and previously agreed upon.

In any case, in spite of the fact that Roberto Lertxundi had the green light from the PCE-EPK Central Committee to go ahead with the initiative, reactions to his proposal were unexpected. Some organizations, among which are some of those on the left bank of the Bilbao bay area—a traditional bastion of the Basque Left—some of the members from Alava and outstanding workers' leaders like Tomas Tueros have charged that the Central Committee's agreement is contrary to the statute and as a result they are demanding a new Congress to resolve the dispute. Actually, this faction does not oppose the principle of the merger, but only the way it is being carried out. It does not admit the possibility that the PCE-EPK might become independent of the Spanish Communist Party, as the Central Committee's document indicates, much less the idea of the party's dissovling itself in a new group. For this faction, the EIA-EPK merger would only make sense if the party headed by Mario Onaindia should change its positions

substantially, coming closer to the traditional positions of the Basque Communists, including maintenance of the EPK's organic ties with the Spanish Communist Party.

Ready for Elections

However, objective conditions do not appear to favor this unity plan of the minority faction of the PCE-EPK. Weakness at the polls, isolation and EPK's tendency to fragment into small groups do not appear to be arguments of any weight when the merger is negotiated. Along with this weak position, the EPK is shaken by a profound crisis which, if it does not result in a regenerating plan to broaden its perspectives, with sufficient clout to recover its lost positions and cause a growth effect, would end up being solved with new divisions and the loss of effective members.

Perhaps for this reason, Roberto Lertxundi and the majority faction of the EPK have decided to speed up the plan for unity with EIA. If, on the contrary, the unifying plan were postponed indefinitely, the EPK would run the risk of losing once and for all a large segment of its rank-and-file membership, the majority, already exasperated by the endless confrontations with the minority faction which have been taking place since the Fourth Congress.

Another question which has had a decisive influence on the EIA-EPK merger plan, no doubt, is the favorable circumstances which would result from the Basque Left Constituent Congress. This decision to change the Basque Left electoral coalition into a party was made by EIA in its last assembly, at which it also decided to dissolve itself, thus facilitating the constituent process. Therefore, actually, EIA does not exist as a political party. The EPK Central Committee, in turn, has decided to take advantage of the occasion to join the Basque Left constituent process. Therefore it has asked EIA to postpone the Basque Left [sic] Congress in order to facilitate the process, a proposal which has been accepted by that organization.

It has also been said that what precipitated the EIA-EPK decision on unification was the notice of certain upcoming, early elections, which could have forced the "matrimonial plan" among the groups headed by Mario Onaidia and Roberto Lertxundi so that they might face the contest with greater possibilities of success. There has been no lack of those who have deduced from this rumor that the unity project might be supported by the Right for the purpose of weakening the position of the Spanish Communist Party. Both questions appear very doubtful, malevolent and, in the second case, simply unreasonable.

Another determining factor in this process is the position to be adopted by the Spanish Communist Party toward the unity plan. The first reactions, still unofficial, appear to confirm that Roberto Lertxundi's decision was not well received at Santisima Trinidad, headquarters of the PCE. According to Nicolas Sartorius, deputy first secretary of the PCE, unity with the EIA was suggested on the spur of the moment by Roberto Lertxundi. Without opposing the idea of the merger, Sartorius asserted that the EPK's detachment from the PCE and its self-dissolution are difficult for the leadership of the Spanish Communist Party to accept. However, the official reaction of the PCE has been cautious up to

now. A first meeting has been held by representatives of the EPK and the PCE, but it ended without any official communique, in anticipation of another meeting which will take place on 26 September. They do not discount the possibility that the Spanish Communist Party may decide to retain the PCE-EPK, in spite of the fact that it might lose one-third of its members. To that effect, Roberto Lertxundi has said that the new party born of the EIA-EPK unification would establish more suitable relations with the national Left and perhaps for that reason the secretary general of the EPK is trying to convince his comrades in the PCE leadership of the wisdom of building bridges with the new party, thus to facilitate things in the future. Generally the event has been received with real enthusiasm by those sectors of Basque society which have been struggling for decades to overcome the division between nationalists and non-nationalists, in the various leftist groups and even among those who are affected by the historic division between communists and socialists. And among these reactions, the decision of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia] leadership to support the initiative is outstanding, given its importance and its possible long-term effects. Nor has there been any lack of condescending reactions, such as that of the deputy for Basque Left, Jose Maria Bandres [name not clear in original], who has spoken of lending a hand to the EPK "to build a national Basque party." The enthusiasm of some members of EPK, in turn, makes it appear that they are inspired by the idea of bringing to the Basque Country the first secretary general of the party and historic leader, Juan Astigarrabia, who after occupying the post of transportation minister in the Basque government of Jose Antonio Aguirre was expelled from the EPK, accused of bowing to nationalist policy, although he was later rehabilitated.

8735

CSO: 3110/18

POLITICAL

ROADBLOCKS TO POSSIBLE MERGER OF BASQUE COMMUNISTS SURFACE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 1 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by P.U.]

[Text] Two weeks after the announcement by the Basque Communist Party (EPK) and the EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party (chief component of Euskadiko Ezkerra [Basque Left]) of the start of conversations aimed at an eventual merger of the two in a new political party, the entire process is threatened by mutual distrusts which surfaced after the first few movements toward a rapprochement.

The standoff was caused by the distribution of a communique from the Executive Committee of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in which, after indicating its "agreement on general lines" with the process undertaken by the EPK, certain conditions are included which in spite of their moderate tone have caused a sharp reaction by Basque Left. This party is now demanding peremptorily a series of explanations which, "should they not be satisfactory, would cause EIA to demand postponement of the conversations now in progress." The note from the PCE Executive Committee--the result of a meeting on Saturday with the EPK leadership--includes, along with a series of obvious points--such as that the respective rank and file must have a role in the process, or that the debate must be open, so that difficulties may be explained and overcome -- a reference to the expected Eurocommunist character of the new party resulting from the merger. This reference--the one which principally irritated the EIA--is based on the resolutions of the Fourth EPK Congress, whose line of argument rests on the fact that the content of a given political line is more important than the initials which identify that line. Given the evolution of EE [Euskadiko Ezkerral, the possibility was considered of a policy which might be called Eurocommunist and would be developed from a party such as the one resulting from the EPK-EE merger.

Greater EIA Evolution

If the present positions of both parties are compared with those they defended on the eve of the 1977 elections, it appears evident that it is EIA, and not EPK, which has evolved more fully, and precisely in the sense of approximating some of the essential components of what is customarily called Eurocommunism: renouncing insurrection, crucial consideration of the role of freedoms, the complementary character of the institutional way in relation to mass mobilization, etc. EPK, in turn, has evolved in the sense of accentuating the character of an autonomous political framework that the Basque Country has acquired because of the implementation of the statue, at the same time taking into consideration the state dimension of any evolution toward socialism.

Shift in Position

In spite of that, the reticence of some sectors of EE with regard to the merger has been emphasized recently in the repeated inclusion in its communiques of expressions which tend to interpret that process as an exclusive result of the EPK's drawing closer to EIA positions and forgetting its own evolution.

That is the reason for the characterization of the Basque Left reply as "arrogant and disproportionate" yesterday in Bilbao by circles favorable to the merger. It is possible, however, that this time the coalition led by Mario Onaindia may not have measured accurately the scope of its shift in position, since Roberto Lertxundi, in turn, facing serious difficulties within his own party, found himself forced to reply to the effect that the attitude of the EE executive committee was "childish and irresponsible" and accused it of "creating artificial problems by placing stones on a road which in itself is already difficult enough."

A few hours after these statements were broadcast by radio, Ramon Ormazabal, president of EPK and chief representative of the current opposed to Lertxundi, made public a statement in which he came out in agreement with the conclusion of the EIA communique, to the effect that it is necessary "to postpone the conversations until we arrive at a satisfactory explanation" as to whether or not it is a question of creating a party which is "not Eurocommunist and not related to the PCE" and whether or not they are in agreement "in the prior dissolution of the EPK in order to participate in the EE Constituent Congress."

8735

CSO: 3110/18

POLITICAL

MODERATE ECONOMIC PLATFORM EXPECTED TO GAIN AT PSOE CONGRESS

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 24 Sep 81 p 18

[Text] The moderate ideas on economic subjects championed by the present leadership of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party] appear to be winning out over more radical ones. The three papers presented by Madrid, Barcelona and Seville, which clearly have a social democratic coloration, are coming out ahead of the Marxist ones-headed by that of the Guipuzcoa group--by a wide margin.

Unless a sudden uprising of the most radical portions of the Spanish Socialist Party takes place, everything indicates that the economic report which will be approved by the 29th Socialist Congress--21 to 24 October--will be characterized by the idea of continuity. The "socialist economic strategy," a document drawn up by party experts on the occasion of the vote of censure of the government, has served as a basis for preparation of the reports produced by three of the most important socialist groups: Madrid, Barcelona and Seville. The absence of any paper referring to general economic policy among the nine reports presented is one sign that the party apparatus is in control of the situation.

However, the report presented by Guipuzcoa--said to have been drafted by Deputy Carlos Solchaga, which the person in question has himself denied--departs considerably from the positions held by the party leadership, and is thought to be the most hard line on the subject of nationalization, a policy on which the PSOE has up until now maintained a moderate position.

Against Private Property

The Guipuzcoa report reads as follows: "Sectors which may be or have deen declared to be in the public interest--national banks, insurance, basic energy, steel and chemical industries, information, etc.--shall be subject to special nationalization procedures, which shall be carried out under regulations designed for functioning in accordance with the general interest." And the regulatory formulas proposed are: the presence of government representatives, the limitation of capital participation, the control of market speculation, and the real pressence—within limits—of the State or of the autonomous communities in the capital of society.

The purchase by the State of the community shares would be done in a special way. "It should be affirmed that purchase of all the shares by public entities sometimes does not have positive features. In the first place, huge expenditures would have

to be made, and once the amount of the purchase was in the pockets of private persons, they would be able to again become the owners, or what perhaps would be worse, the creditors of the public entities, if the investment were in bonds or other forms of credit."

The papers presented by Madrid, Barcelona and Sevilla, which are exactly the same, support a moderate policy in the area of nationalization, which would only affect enterprises which are clearly of public service. On the subject of energy, another controversial topic, the officialist report comes out in support of "increasing the use of primary energy only in the same proportion with GDP increase." As for the choice among the different forms of energy production, the three are together in asserting that "Spain's demand for electric power can be met until the end of this century without the need for any nuclear contribution, even taking into consideration a rate of increase in consumption as high as 5 percent."

Public Enterprise

The public enterprise policy which will come out of the 28th Congress may well be predicted from the paper presented by the Asturias group, which was another surprise. The basic idea inspiring the wording of this point in the report says that "public enterprise should accommodate itself as far as possible to the laws of the market-place and of competition," and it points out the need to create a Law for Regulation of the Managerial Public Sector, departing from the patent form of the Public Enterprise Statute. Also to be noted is "the comparison between the public and private sectors, which must be placed on the same level of economic activity."

As a result of this point, the report says that "conditions should exist in the public sector which would facilitate managerial performance: autonomy, responsibility for actions."

The authors of the report visualize the presence of a "holding company," which would act as a "cushion between the enterprises and the administration," with "the typical functions of a private 'holding company.'"

8131

CSO: 3110/17

MILITARY

BRIEFS

NUCLEAR MISSILE LEAK ALLEGATIONS—For the past several days, dead fish have been drifting ashore along the coastal strip stretching from Magosa [Famagusta] to Yeni Erenkoy. The fishing office in Magosa reports that since several days ago, complaints on this score have increased and that dead fish, particularly of the Orfoz and Sorgoz [Translation unknown] types present a great danger from the standpoint of the public's health. Meanwhile, it is alleged that the fish kill was a result of the joint maneuvers carried out by the Soviets and the Syrians and was caused by poisonous substances coming from the nuclear warhead bearing missiles. The Magosa municipality has taken the matter in hand. It calls on the public to refrain from eating the fish which are drifting ashore. [Text] [Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 6 Oct 81 p 1]

CSO: 4654/32

LARS 2 SYSTEM DELIVERED TO BUNDESWEHR

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 81 pp 58-61

Text On 1 July, the light artillery rocket system 2 (LARS 2) was turned over to the Bundeswehr at the Baumholder training grounds in the Rhineland-Palatinate. LARS 2 consists of a 110mm rocket launcher mounted on the 7-ton gl second generation truck, the rocket artillery fire control unit FERA complete with maintenance gear MES II and III as well as light artillery rockets. All three components given to the army constituted new hardware and software or re-developed, improved or completely overhauled hardware.

In late 1956, the engineering firm of Sommerkorn, which was founded by Nobel Dynamite among others, began work on a light artillery rocket system. Several proposals were made but it was the 36-barrel rocket launcher submitted by the firm of Wegmann that was ultimately selected. In the late sixties, the Bundeswehr procured 209 such systems mounted on Magirus-Deutz Jupiter trucks from Wegmann. The rockets were developed and for the most part produced by Nobel Dynamite.

After the system had been in use for more than 10 years, after more than a million kilometers had been logged and about 100,000 rockets had been fired, it was decided to modernize the system and to give it a major overhaul. The chief contract for the development of LARS 2 was let to Rocket Systems, Inc, a subsidiary of Nobel Dynamite, AEG and Honeywell, which was dissolved in the spring of 1981 after completing its job.

Launchers

Delivery of the 209 reconditioned launchers began in December 1980 in monthly instalments of 8 to 18 units. Wegmann's production sequence is divided into four main segments: dismantling and examination of all components; overhaul of components depending on damage on the basis of work orders issued by quality control; manufacture of new components; assembly, commencement of operation, performance test.

The new elements of the system are the following: The 7-ton gl, 6x6 M.A.N. truck which serves as the system's carrier; a frame connecting the truck to the weapons unit; the launcher's entire system of cables and wires; the rocket aiming, testing and firing unit (REPAG 2) specially adapted to rockets to be fired with subcaliber ammunition; the data processing unit half of which is situated in the

launcher itself with its receiver and its main and subsidiary display screen on which the FERA firing and command signals are received, displayed and processed.

The rocket launcher's ground supports were redesigned as were the special tool kits MES 2 and 3 and the telephone system.

FERA

The second new component of LARS 2 are the completely new FERA fire control units, designed by Contraves in Switzerland and in Germany and built by Contraves Germany. 50 such units are on order. FERA, mounted on a 5-ton gl truck, 4x4, has the following components, housed in a cab linked to the truck by a connecting frame: a guidance unit; a Doppler radar unit with telescopic antennas; a data processing unit; an energy supply of its own; a telecommunications system and a data transmission unit.

The maintenance equipment for FERA includes an MES 2 set installed on a VW bus and an MES 3 set housed in a cubicle aboard a 5-ton tmil truck, 4x2, and a multipurpose assembly on a 2-ton tmil truck 4x2.

FERA's mission is to compute the ground commands for the pilot shots according to position reports and firing orders taking meteorological data supplied by FERA into account; transmission of ground commands to the ground launchers via computer; computation of the trajectory of up to four pilot rockets with homing devices; computation of firing orders for all launchers based on a comparison of intended and actual trajectory; transmission of firing orders to all launchers; execution and transmission of countdown.

Rockets

The "old" LARS 1 had used the following rocket types: dummy rockets, training rockets and smoke rockets all manufactured by Diehl; DM-11 fragmentation rockets with percussion fuses and DM-21 fragmentation rockets with ground clearance fuses manufactured by Nobel Dynamite; also, as a kind of forerunner of the new generation of rockets, the DM-701 Diehl mine ejection rocket with a warhead containing eight AT-1 anti-tank mines.

The following new rockets will be used as part of LARS 2: the DM-711 mine ejection rocket, manufactured by Nobel Dynamite, containing five AT-2 hollow charge mines which drop to the target by parachute after ejection from the rocket.

The AT-2 mines, which are also used in the mine launcher system and in the medium artillery rocket launcher MLRS, are released upon contact of the sensor wire and upon pickup. At the end of the preset time on the ground, the mine self-destructs.

Then, there is the DM-28 training rocket, a new version of the obsolete DM-15 smoke rocket. The redesign of the warhead is being executed by Buck, whereas the munitions depot at Simmersfeld is responsible for dismantling and reassembling the rocket and overhauling the packing cases.

Finally, there is the DM-39 radar homing rocket with a radar reflector housed in the warhead manufactured by Felten & Guilleaume. It is used for pilot shots for calculating the actual trajectory with the FERA unit.

The LARS 2 are assigned to the artillery regiments of the 12 German divisions. Each artillery regiment has a rocket artillery battalion composed of two batteries of eight LARS 2 and two FERA each.

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GENERAL.

BONN INCREASES DEVELOPMENT AID TO POOREST COUNTRIES

Bonn DIE WELT in German 24 Sep 81 p 11

[Article by Heinz Heck: "Bonn Now Helps the Poorest Countries Most"]

[Text] Bonn--In 1980 the FRG increased its contributions to the poorest developing countries (LLDC) to DM 986.4 million from DM 899.5 million in the previous year. In absolute figures, this makes the FRG the largest contributor to those especially needy countries. Public grants to all developing countries increased by 4 percent (DM 246 million) to almost DM 6.4 billion.

These are two of the most important statements contained in a FRG memorandum entitled "German Development Policy, 1980" which was published yesterday. Member countries annualy submit to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris a detailed report for the annual analysis by its Development Committee (DAC).

Said Minister for Economic Cooperation Rainer Offergeld in connection with submitting the report: "The great contributions to the Third World by the FRG play an important part in securing the peace. Because wherever proverty, hunger and misery exist, social and political unrest and conflict follow, which in the long run may constitute a danger to world peace."

The positive development in Bonn's contribution is described as the result of a disproportionate increase of the development budget. Its share of the FRG economy is said to have grown from 1.8 percent in 1977 to 2.5 percent in 1980—an indication of the increased significance accorded by Bonn to North-South politics despite economic and financial difficulties.

The simultaneously observed increase in expenditures by the private sector from DM 6.3 to 10.9 billion (an increase of 73.4 percent) is considered by Bonn to be a signif-cant contribution to economic and technological progress of these countries. Total expenditures (private and public) have therefore increased by DM 5.9 billion (43.9 percent) to a total of DM 19.2 billion and amount to 1.28 percent of the GNP.

Together with the 1981 development budget of DM 5.84 billion (an increase of 8.8 percent), in addition to the rest of the public funds, this year's production volume (ODA) may for the first time exceed the DM 7 billion mark and at the same time again reach 0.44 percent of the GNP (0.43 percent in 1980).

During the last few years Bonn has improved and simplified the allocation process for bilateral cooperation. As of this year there will be a new demarcation between monetary and technological aid; this will result in involving only a single executive agency for each separate project.

In view of increased aid to the LLDC it does not come as a surprise that aid promises to Africa and Asia have markedly increased while those to European and American developing countries have significantly decreased. As to economic areas, German aid mostly benefits energy production, communication and transport, as well as agriculture, forestry and fishery. However, the share of agricultural aid projects for 1980 has decreased from the previous year from 17.2 to 12.2 percent.

The FRG regards mixed financing, i.e., a mixture of financial aid and commercial credit, as an "important instrument" primarily for reinforcing a transfer of resources to progressive developing countries.

The percentage of multilateral payments of total public expenditures has stabilized at 35.5 percent since 1979, after continuous increases in previous years. However, Bonn has not insisted on a minimum or maximum percentage for this share. However, the FRG considers continued ongoing support to these institutions to be of special importance. At the same time, it recommends increased participation by OPEC, especially in the World Bank, to generate larger creidts for energy production.

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